United States Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution

Stop Gun Violence: Extreme Risk Order / “Red Flag” Laws

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Introduction

The United States Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution has jurisdiction over “Enforcement and protection of constitutional rights” and “Statutory guarantees of civil rights and civil liberties.” The Subcommittee does not have jurisdiction over general crime control matters or law enforcement grants, which are instead in the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice and Counterterrorism.1 As the jurisdictional statement of the Subcommittee on the Constitution affirms, Congress has the duty to enforce and protect the people’s rights, rather than passively relying only on the judicial branch to do so. This Subcommittee is therefore a good forum for the examination of state laws that allow a person to be stripped of Second Amendment rights and of analogous rights under state constitutions, and to be subject to the uncompensated confiscation of property.

So-called “red flag” laws, or “extreme risk protection orders”, have been enacted in 19 States and the District of Columbia.2

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1 United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittees, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/subcommittees.
2 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18125, 18150; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-103; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38C;
10 DEL. CODE ANN., §§ 7703-7704; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2510.02-04; FLA. STAT. § 790.401; HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 134-64(f); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/35(c), 67/40(c); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2; MD.
CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-602); MASS. ANN. LAW. ch. 140 § 131R; NEV. REV. STATS. § 33.500 et seq.;
STAT. ANN. § 166.527; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-8.3-1 et. seq.; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 4053-4054; VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-152.13, et seq.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.030.
Such orders can be legitimate when fair procedures accurately identify imminently dangerous individuals. There are no states that have sufficient due process from start to finish. A proper red flag statute would incorporate the best practices found among the various state laws. These include:

- Confiscation petitions only from law enforcement officers or prosecutors (e.g., Connecticut).
- Ex parte confiscation petitions may be granted only by clear and convincing evidence (Oregon).
- Ex parte petitions should be allowed only when the petitioner provides specific evidence that an ex parte proceeding is necessary (partially so in Vermont).
- Confiscation orders may be issued only if the court finds there is no reasonable alternative (e.g., Connecticut, Nevada).
- Respondents may have the benefit of state-paid counsel (Colorado).
- A confiscation order issued after an adversarial hearing must be based on clear and convincing evidence (most modern statutes).
- Accusers must appear in court, testify under oath, and be subject to cross-examination (the opposite of the model currently being pushed by the gun control organizations, and adopted in some states).
- Automatic termination of orders after the time limit expires (most modern statutes).
- Orders may be renewed only by presentation of proof to the same standards as was needed for the original order (same).
- A respondent may have a short period of time to peaceably surrender the firearms, unless the court finds based on specific facts of the case that immediate confiscation is necessary (Vermont, Oregon, Washington).
- The respondent’s firearms may be directly given to and stored by any third party who can lawfully possess firearms (above, plus Connecticut, Florida, but there with the flaw that police must confiscate the guns first).
- Government agencies that store confiscated arms must exercise care so that the arms are not damaged or stolen (most modern laws).
- Government agencies may not charge storage fees (no protections in current laws; exorbitant fees are common in California).
- Upon the termination of an order, the arms must be promptly returned to the owner, without the owner needing to file court petition or other paperwork (some modern statutes).
- Innocent victims of knowingly false accusations should have a civil remedy (included in the Colorado bill that passed the House but deleted in the Senate).

When Confucius was asked what would be the first step if a government sought his advice, he answered, “It would certainly be to rectify the names. . . . If the names
are not correct, language is without an object.” Many bills that claim to be about “Extreme Risk Protection Orders” actually cover much lower-level risks, or just “a danger.”

The term “red flag” is notable. In modern automobile racing, a red flag signals that everyone must cease activity. A red flag is not waved at a dangerous driver; rather, a red flag shuts down everyone. The first “red-flag law” was enacted in the United Kingdom in 1865. The purpose was to stifle the use of automobiles, because autos competed with railroads and horse-drawn carriages, and reduced the demand for buggy manufacturers and horse breeders. According to the 1865 statute, every “road locomotive”—what we today call an “automobile”—had to have a three-person crew. One of the crew shall “precede such Locomotive on Foot by not less than Sixty Yards, and shall carry a Red Flag constantly displayed” to “warn the Riders and Drivers of Horses of the Approach of such Locomotives.” The effect was to render the automobile nearly useless, since it could not travel faster than the walking speed of the red flagman. For good measure, the statute limited automobile speed to 2 miles per hour in towns, and 4 M.P.H. elsewhere. The law did succeed in repressing the use of automobiles until Parliament reformed it in 1896, removed the red flag requirement, and substantially raised speed limits.

Some people are concerned that today’s “red flag” gun laws are meant in the same broadly repressive spirit as the “red flag” automobile rules and laws from which the take their name. Presuming that at least some of modern proponents do not so intend, this written testimony will not use the term “red flag.” Nor will it use the term “extreme risk protection orders,” which are deliberately misleading description of laws that are not limited to “extreme” risks.

Instead, the testimony will generally use the term “gun confiscation order” (GCO). The term is accurate, since every so-called “red flag” law creates a process for the confiscation of firearms.

Persons who favor firearms confiscation with little due process should remember that the system they are creating will eventually be extended to other topics. That has long been the pattern for gun control legislation. For example, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1938 was directly patterned on the National Firearms Act of 1934, using the congressional tax power to exercise what amounted to a national police power, even though the Constitution refused to grant Congress that general power. Likewise, the current federal prohibition on the personal possession of marijuana comes from the Controlled Substances Act of 1971, which used the Gun Control Act of 1968 as a model for the notion that the constitutional grant of congressional power “To regulate Commerce...among the several States” was actually a grant of power to criminalize the mere noncommercial, intrastate possession of an item. Extreme measures for property confiscation, warrantless searches and seizures, forfeitures, and other

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4 For example, because lightning or a crash has made it too dangerous for anyone to drive.
abuses that were created for one controversial item or activity eventually become generally applied.\textsuperscript{6}

I. Problems with some statutes

A. Too many gun confiscation orders are wrongly issued.

Any procedure that allows a judge to hear only one side of a case necessarily will produce a high error rate. The data from the two states with the oldest laws indicate diverse problems.

In Indiana, firearms may be sued to a court-issued warrant issued by a judge based on certain conditions. Thereafter, a prosecutor may file a petition for the government to retain the firearm, and the respondent has notice and an opportunity to appear. A study of Marion County, Indiana, from 2006 to 2013, found that prosecutors took an average of 144 days to file the petition, and courts then took an average of 140 days to hear the case—in other words, 284 days from the seizure of the firearm until the gunowner’s opportunity to be heard.

“Court retention of the seized firearms closely tracked the gun owner’s failure to appear in court for the retention hearing; indeed, after the first year..., the frequency of failure to appear was very close, if not identical, to the frequency of court retention of the weapons.” “The court dismissed of cases at the initial hearing, closely linked to the defendant’s presence at the hearing.”\textsuperscript{7}

In the confiscations where the firearms possessor did not contest the confiscation, there were likely many who should not have firearms, due to danger to others. There


\textsuperscript{7} George F. Parker, \textit{Circumstances and Outcomes of a Firearm Seizure Law: Marion County, Indiana, 2006-2013}, 33 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE & THE LAW 308 (2015). According to the article, the Indiana GCO law is not much used outside of Indianapolis (Marion County).

Besides the problem of orders that are later overturned, some orders that are not overturned may be inappropriate. Case reports of particular confiscations are not widely available. But the Uniform Law Commission obtained an annual report from the Santa Barbara County, California, Sheriff’s Office describing gun confiscations in 2016. There were eight confiscations, and most of them seem appropriate, at least as described by the Sheriff’s Office. But in another case:

June of 2016, a 57-year-old Santa Maria woman was involved in a domestic disturbance with her husband. The woman struck her husband in the leg and poured soda on his head after discovering text message and a partially nude photograph a woman had sent to her husband’s phone. The suspect began carrying her Glock handgun within her residence. The woman was arrested for cohabitant battery and a GVRO was obtained to confiscate the Glock handgun.

were also probably some who were inaccurately targeted, but who lacked the resources to contest a confiscation. They might not have been able to take off work. Or they might not have been able to afford an attorney.

A Connecticut study revealed what may be a different set of problems. Researchers examined 764 gun confiscation warrants. They found that mandatory data were missing most of the time: “Another reporting gap in the law and associated policies is that the outcome of the mandatory hearing after the seizure (where judges decide whether the firearms can be returned) is not reported to DMHAS. In over 70% of the cases, the outcome of the hearings was unknown.” One possibility is that Connecticut courts are extremely sloppy in filing mandatory reports. Another possibility is that, at least sometimes, the mandatory hearing never takes place, and the police just keep the guns without a hearing.

If for simplicity we say that exactly 70 percent (not “over 70%”) of cases lacked full records, then there were 229 out of the 764 cases in which there was a report of the mandatory hearing. Of these, the guns were returned to their owner in 20 cases (9%). This would indicate that the ex parte process in Connecticut has an error rate of 9%.

As detailed in Part II.H, below, there has been a problem in Connecticut of respondents being pressured by government not to retain counsel to contest seizures. The reversals of ex parte confiscation orders might have been higher than 9% if some respondents not been discouraged from exercising their right to counsel. The missing 70% of the mandatory reports do not inspire confidence in the system’s transparency or conscientiousness.

Error rates for newer laws based on the GLCPGV/Bloomberg model are likely to be even higher. Connecticut requires that a petition be filed by two law enforcement officers only after they have conducted an independent investigation. Indiana also requires that petitions be filed by law enforcement. The GLCPGV/Bloomberg system, though, allows petitions to be filed by a very wide variety of people, including ex-girlfriends or ex-boyfriends. The GLCPGV/Bloomberg system does not require any corroborating evidence. Indeed, as Colorado’s bill moved through the legislature, legislators removed a requirement that evidence be “corroborated.”

B. A gun control organization blocked a model law from the Conference of Chief Justices and the Uniform Law Commission.

In 2018, the Conference of Chief Justices asked the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) to draft a model law for “extreme risk protection orders.” The ULC convened a Study Committee representing diverse perspectives and expertise, such as the

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National Sheriffs Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, psychiatric experts, state courts, pro-gun and anti-gun advocates, pro-gun and anti-gun state legislators, and others.\textsuperscript{10} I was a member of the ULC Study Committee. The Committee overwhelmingly voted to recommend that the ULC move forward with drafting a model law. Support for a model law came from across the political spectrum, including all the state legislators, law enforcement, and the courts. Overt opposition to the model law was expressed only by the GLCPGV, which preferred that legislators use only the GLCPGV/Bloomberg model, and not the more careful and balanced approach that would likely be produced by the Uniform Law Commission. Perhaps, as a result of lobbying from GLCPGV and Bloomberg, the Uniform Law Commissioners later voted not to draft a model law.

\textbf{C. Extreme laws will not be enforced in many jurisdictions.}

The confiscation bill passed by the Colorado General Assembly had an effective date of January 1, 2020. But in some counties, the date might as well be “never,” since many counties and sheriffs’ offices have announced that they will not enforce the bill.\textsuperscript{11}

Throughout the United States, elected sheriffs have been declaring that they will adhere to their oaths to enforce the U.S. and state constitutions—which means that they will not enforce extreme laws that trample civil rights.\textsuperscript{12}

Such local resistance is as old as James Madison’s Virginia Resolution and Thomas Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution against the unconstitutional Sedition Act of 1798.\textsuperscript{13} The tradition has continued ever since, including in state and local refusal to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Uniform Law Commission, Study Committee on Extreme Risk Protection Orders, Nov. 30, 2018, Washington, D.C. Attendees from the Uniform Law Commission were Barry Hawkins, Co-Chair, Connecticut; Cam Ward, Co-Chair, Alabama; Steve Wilborn, Vice President, Kentucky; James Bopp, Jr., Commissioner, Indiana; Raymond Pepe, Commissioner, Pennsylvania; Steve Willborn, Interim Executive Director; Cam Pestinger, ULC Fellow (recorder). Stakeholder attendees: were American Psychiatric Association, Colleen Coyle; Brady Foundation, Josh Scharff & Kelsey Rogers; Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Kelly Roskam; Conference of Chief Justices/National Center for State Courts, Blake Kavanaugh; Giffords Law Center, Nico Bocour & David Chipman; International Association of Chiefs of Police, David Thomas; National District Attorneys Association, Cari Steele; National Rifle Association, Josh Savani; National Sheriffs’ Association, Jonathan Thompson; Senate Judiciary Committee, Aaron Cummings; University of Denver, David Kopel. Two subsequent telephonic Study Committee meetings in December included additional attendees.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Sherrie Peif, \textit{More counties join Second Amendment Sanctuary movement; recall efforts beginning to take shape}, COMPLETE COLORADO, Mar. 14, 2019. \url{https://pagetwo.completecolorado.com/2019/03/14/more-counties-join-second-amendment-sanctuary-movement-recall-efforts-beginning-to-take-shape/}. Complete Colorado is one of the largest daily newspapers in Colorado, based on online readership. It is affiliated with the Independence Institute.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Dan Frosch & Jacob Gershman, \textit{Rural Sheriffs Defy New Gun Measures}, WALLSTREETJOURNAL, Mar. 10, 2019; Mary Hudetz \textit{New Mexico Sheriffs’ Gun Laws Protest Follows Other States}, Associated Press, Mar. 1, 2019.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Virginia Resolution of Dec. 24, 1798, § 3; Kentucky Resolution of Nov. 10, 1798, §§ 1, 8, \textit{in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION} 540,
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
assist enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. More recently, many states, counties, and cities have adopted “sanctuary” status against assisting enforcement of laws against illegal aliens, marijuana users, or gun owners.

Sheriffs, county commissioners, and other elected officials always take oaths to uphold the United States Constitution and their state Constitution. The duty to uphold the federal and state constitutions necessarily requires not enforcing statutes that are contrary to the constitutions.

In New Mexico, many sheriffs stated that they would not enforce confiscation orders. So the legislative majority retaliated by authorizing lawsuits against law enforcement officers for injuries resulting from any decision not to enforce a statute or ordinance.

Consider the practical effect of the new personal liability. A county ordinance sets a speed limit of 45 M.P.H. on a certain county road. A deputy working a speed trap uses a radar gun to identify vehicles traveling 47, 45, 49, 46, 45, 44, 48, and 61 M.P.H. The deputy ignores the three cars that were speeding less than 5 M.P.H. The deputy

543 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891). Elliot’s Debates is a five-volume collection of materials on Founding Era. It is available on-line at https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html.


17 The statute orders law enforcement officers to file a petition, without taking time for further investigation: “A law enforcement officer shall file a petition for an extreme risk firearm protection order upon receipt of credible information from a reporting party that gives the agency or officer probable cause to believe that a respondent poses a significant danger of causing imminent personal injury to self or others by having in the respondent’s custody or control or by purchasing, possessing or receiving a firearm.” N.M. STAT. ANN., § 40-17-5(D).

The new statute authorizing lawsuits states that governmental immunity does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage resulting from assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation of character, violation of property rights, failure to comply with duties established pursuant to statute or law or deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or New Mexico when caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their duties. For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” means a public officer vested by law with the power to maintain order, to make arrests for crime or to detain persons suspected of committing a crime, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes.

Id., at § 41-4-12.
pursues the 61 M.P.H. car and issues a ticket. Because the deputy ignored a legal obligation to enforce the county ordinance against the 47 M.P.H. car, three minutes after the car passed the deputy, the car hit a child who suddenly ran into the road. If the deputy had stopped the 47 M.P.H. vehicle to ticket it, the child would not have been injured. Under New Mexico’s new statute, the child (or the child’s parents) may sue the deputy personally.

Discretion is essential to law enforcement work. There are many situations in which law enforcement officers use discretion and choose not to investigate certain illegal acts, even when a complainant comes forward. If officers are worried about being personally sued whenever they decide not to investigate a violation of the law, officers will be much less effective, on the whole. Officers may divert their attention towards enforcement of less serious violations.

Depending on the situation and local mores, an officer might choose not to enforce violations of laws about: ticket scalping (such as when officers at a public event do not enforce against every instance of ticket scalping they observe); marijuana, indecent dancing, indecent waitering, prostitution, bigamy, a minor misrepresenting his age in order to obtain an obscene (as to minors) book or magazine, interference with communications (such as listening to someone else’s phone call without permission, as some parents of teenagers have been known to do), falsely representing oneself as incapacitated, personal gambling, and commercial gambling (with certain exceptions, such as bingo and lotteries).

Can nonenforcement of any of these provisions cause “personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage,” for which an officer could be personally sued? People under the influence of marijuana sometimes perpetrate violent or property crimes against third persons. Failure to enforce sexual regulation laws in the early evening can lead to the transmission of a STD by midnight. When an officer decides not to investigate a citizen complaint that an individual is engaged in social gambling, the individual’s gambling problem could soon result in health problems and property damage for others.

How often could law enforcement officers be sued for “failure to comply with duties established pursuant to statute or law”? No one can say for certain.

The New Mexico liability statute is an example of how some GCO advocates are willing to tear down established legal structures that stand in the way of confiscation. As discussed in Part III.A, Colorado created a special exemption from its rules

18 Id., at § 30-46-1.
19 Id., at § 30-9-14-1.
20 Id., at § 30-9-14-2.
21 Id., at § 30-9-2.
22 Id., at § 30-10-1.
23 Id., at § 30-16-12.
24 Id., at § 30-19-2.
25 Id., at § 30-19-3.
limiting no-knock raids, in order to allow confiscations to *always* be carried out by no-knock.

**D. Social science studies**

The Rand Corporation’s Gun Policy in America project has examined social science research on many different gun control laws. Rand “found no qualifying studies showing that extreme risk protection orders” decreased or increased “any of the eight outcomes we investigated,” such as violent crime, suicide, or mass shootings.  

This should not be surprising. Gun confiscation laws are new, and few states have much experience; the oldest are Connecticut (1999), Indiana (2005), Washington (2016), and California (2016).

One study looked at suicide in Connecticut and Indiana. “Whereas Indiana demonstrated an aggregate decrease in suicides, Connecticut’s estimated reduction in firearm suicides was offset by increased nonfirearm suicides.”

The theory of confiscation laws is that if potentially suicidal persons are deprived of firearms, they will be much less likely to complete suicide because firearms are so much more lethal than other means. This is incorrect. Some other methods of suicide are nearly as likely as firearms to result in death. The figures are shooting 83.7%, hanging 76.7%, and drowning 67.2%.

Gun confiscation advocates, however, cite an article claiming that for every twenty gun confiscation orders, one suicide is prevented. The figure seems overstated for several reasons. First, in 55% of the confiscations, the respondent was taken to a hospital because of a mental health crisis. This indicates that many of the respondents could have been suicidal. If in the future they were less likely to commit suicide, the main reason might not have been that their gun was transported to a police station; rather, the life-saver was transporting the person in crisis to a place where treatment was provided.

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30 Gary Kleck, *The effect of firearms on suicide*, in *GUN STUDIES: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO POLITICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE* 319, table 17.3 (Jennifer Carlson et al. eds. 2019) (using “the largest set of suicides and suicide attempts ever employed in the computation of method-specific suicide fatality rates”). The low rates for some methods (e.g., cutting, drugs) indicate that these forms of self-inflicted injury are often a cry for help, and not an earnest attempt at fatality. *Id.* at 321-23.

The study categorizes every instance of self-inflicted injury that led to hospitalization as a suicide attempt. This is common practice in epidemiological articles, but it seems contrary to common sense. Deliberately shooting oneself in the foot is not the same as deliberately shooting oneself in the head. An intentional shot to the foot is a self-inflicted injury that would likely result in hospitalization, and it is a sign of a severe mental problem, but it is not a suicide attempt.

Shooting oneself in the head is not an act that allows for gradations. It is not possible for the head-shooter to attempt “just to wound.” Nor is gradation very easy for hanging and drowning. Self-poisoning is much easier to gradate. If the fatal dose of a particular prescription drug is twenty pills, taking eight pills may be a hospitalizable cry for help in the form of a suicidal gesture; taking eighty pills evinces a strong determination to end life. Some items used in hospitalizable self-harm can be used in precise amounts, such as pills. Other items in self-harm are closer to all-or-nothing, like shooting or hanging. People who the most earnest intentions choose the means most likely to cause death, and people who have ambiguous intentions can choose means that are much less likely to result in death.

An article in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* described 21 cases of gun confiscation under California’s law. The article did not conduct statistical analysis. Instead, the authors examined records of 159 gun confiscation orders in California. Of the 159 confiscations for which the authors obtained information, there were “21 cases in which ERPOs were used in efforts to prevent mass shootings.” The 21 cases are described in the article’s appendix, and not all of them support the utility or need for gun confiscation orders. In some cases, the court denied a confiscation order. In others, confiscation orders were issued, but were superfluous, since the respondents had been arrested for various crimes, and the firearms were seized pursuant to the arrest.

However, some of the cases did involve individuals who had spoken or written about shooting other people. Many of these individuals exhibited symptoms of mental illness. From a public safety viewpoint, the confiscation of their firearms was appropriate. Unfortunately, the appendix does not indicate that any of these individuals were given additional mental health treatment, although it is possible that treatment was provided in some instances not recorded in court or police records.

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32 *Id.* at 201, n.86 (“Case fatality rates for specific suicide methods in the Connecticut population are calculated by combining data on suicide deaths with data on hospital discharges for intentional self-inflicted injuries, using 2012 as the index year.”).

33 Pills can be taken with exact dosages. As for knives, the Romans and the Japanese samurai carried out suicide in absolute earnest by slicing their intestines. Other people put themselves in the hospital with lesser, survivable knife injuries not inflicted in a manner to cause almost immediate death.

Because mass shootings are a small percentage of total homicide, it is unlikely that preventing even several mass shootings would result in a statistically significant effect on homicide rates. That said, because mass shootings are so traumatic to the American public in general, by causing widespread fear, a law that stops some mass shootings is very beneficial—provided that the law is fair and does not harm innocents.

There are no data on how many people who make threats to shoot people carry out such threats. It is possible that the vast majority of such threats are just idle words. Even so, it is prudent to disarm individuals who make specific, credible threats. It is possible for a law to be beneficial in certain cases, even if the number of such cases is too low to have a statistically significant impact.

Another study examined crime and suicide in Connecticut, Indiana, Washington, and California. It found no statistically significant changes in “murder, suicide, the number of people killed in mass public shootings, robbery, aggravated assault, or burglary.”

**E. Badly written laws endanger public safety**

The GLCPGV/Bloomberg model, with its flimsy and unreliable procedures for ex parte orders, ensure that orders will be issued against innocent and peaceable individuals. The problem is aggravated by the GLCPGV/Bloomberg mandates for automatic, no-notice confiscation.

One person, Gary J. Willis, a 61-year-old black man, has been killed by the GLCPGV/Bloomberg system. In November 2018, a month after Maryland’s new GCO law went into effect, police in Ferndale, Maryland, showed up at Mr. Willis's house at 5:17 A.M., announcing that they had come to take his guns. They talked for a while, then argued, and then the police shot him to death. The victim’s niece said that her late uncle, “likes to speak his mind,” but “wouldn’t hurt anybody.” “I’m just dumbfounded right now,” she continued. “They didn’t need to do what they did.”

In the GLCPGV/Bloomberg model, a respondent never receives notice of anything until the police show up to confiscate his or her firearms. This creates an inherently volatile and dangerous situation for law enforcement and the public. The safer approach is to authorize no-notice confiscation only when a court has made specific factual findings about why such an approach is needed. See Part III.B, below.

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Given the dangers imposed by the GLCPGV/Bloomberg model, it is no wonder that so many sheriffs are refusing to put their deputies and the public in harm’s way to enforce a confiscation order that has a significant possibility of being wrong, and that can easily be obtained by a spurned dating partner.

A second danger of the GLCPGV/Bloomberg system is the disarmament of innocent victims. In St. Cloud, Florida, a drifter named Jon Carpenter (110 pounds, brown eyes, black hair) threatened an elderly couple. A confiscation order was issued against a different Jon Carpenter (200 pounds, hazel eyes, bald). 37

In another Florida case, an ex parte confiscation order was issued against a man because of a pair of social media posts. The first was a photo of an AR-15 that he had built at home (a perfectly legal act), along with the caption “It’s done. Hooray.” The second post criticized teenage anti-gun activists for trying to take away people’s rights. 38

Eighty-four-year-old Stephen Nichols had served in the Korean War and for six decades as a police officer in Tisbury, Massachusetts. In retirement, he worked as a school crossing guard. One day at a diner, he complained that the school’s assigned police officer was often “leaving his post” to buy coffee. Nichols worried that a criminal might exploit the officer’s frequent absences and “shoot up the school.” As a result, a Massachusetts “red flag” order was issued against Nichols; his firearms license, which had first been issued in 1958, was confiscated, as were all his guns and ammunition. It took nearly half a year before his firearms license was restored, after Nichols filed suit. 39

After surveying other cases in which gun were confiscated because of lawful First Amendment activity, and describing how some GCO statutes encourage such abuse, two scholars recommended the following reforms:

- “First, and perhaps most obvious, speech that is protected by the First Amendment should be eliminated from judicial consideration of whether an ERPO is warranted.”
- Second, statutory “language should make it clear that a threat of violence means a true threat of violence not sheltered by the First Amendment.”

38 Jacob Sullum, States Are Depriving Innocent People of the Their Second Amendment Rights, REASON, Nov. 2019, at 49.
• “Third, if statutes continue to permit the use of protected speech to determine whether an ERPO should be granted, then those statutes should be amended to specify that protected speech be given less weight than an individual’s prior conduct, which generally does not trigger any First Amendment issues.”

• “Fourth, once again assuming that statutes continue to permit the use of protected speech in ERPO determinations, then not only should such speech weigh less than a person’s conduct, but statutes should impose clear temporal-recency requirements and quantity mandates.…[T]he older the statement, the less that speech should factor into the ERPO equation.…[S]tatutes should specify that there must be at least more than one instance of disturbing, but protected, speech within the temporal-recency time period in order for the speech to be considered.”

• “Fifth, and at a macro level beyond individual red flag laws, the Supreme Court must clarify what constitutes a true threat of violence.”

Even when respondents finally get a hearing, innocent people may still be wrongfully disarmed if they are denied basic due process rights at the hearing—such as the right to counsel or the right to cross-examine the accuser. At the Uniform Law Commission meeting, I raised the problem of disarming the innocent. GLCPGV representative David Chipman retorted that disarmed victims could just buy a replica gun and scare the criminals away.

Many “gun control” advocates oppose gun ownership and Second Amendment rights. For example, in District of Columbia v. Heller an amicus brief of New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and the Legal Coalition Against Violence (which is now part of the GLCPGV) contended that the Founders had not “intended the Amendment to protect the right to possess guns for self-defense and hunting.” They concluded: the Second Amendment “does not constrain firearms regulations in the District of Columbia or in the States or their political subdivisions.”

The same groups that today are writing extreme confiscation laws are the same groups that have opposed any right to gun ownership. No wonder that they are blase’ about depriving innocent citizens of their right of self-defense.

Some people argue that ex parte confiscation orders based on low standards are acceptable because the harm inflicted will last only a few weeks, until the respondent receives a hearing and can present her side of the story. Sometimes, little harm will

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42 Id. at 25.
be done. If hearings are prompt, an individual might miss a few weekends of target practice. But there may be more substantial harms as well.

It is well-known in family and domestic law that ex parte procedures with low standards of evidence are often abused by angry spouses in a divorce, jilted lovers, and so on.\textsuperscript{43} The GLCPGV system is well-adapted for abusers to disarm their victims—and if the abusers so choose, to attack a victim who has been rendered defenseless.

Of course, the risk of criminal prosecution deters some attacks—but some attacks are perpetrated by irrational people who are consumed by rage or who don’t plan on living much longer. A good law includes fair procedures to ensure that arms are confiscated only from dangerous people, not from innocent people who are targeted by domestic abusers.

Further, “These laws may also overstate the relationship between gun violence and mental illness, which propagates stigma and may discourage people from seeking mental health treatment.”\textsuperscript{44}

New York’s 2013 SAFE Act is not formally a “red flag” law, but it has the same effect. A health professional may send a county a notice that the professional believes the individual to be a danger to self or others. The notice automatically prohibits the individual from possessing arms for five years. There is no requirement that the individual be notified that her continuing possession of firearms has just become illegal. There are no procedures for the individual to contest the decision of the health professional. The New York system has been criticized for being stigmatizing, for deterring people from seeking mental health care, for being grossly overbroad, and for its absence of due process.\textsuperscript{45}

\section*{II. Fair procedures for petitions and hearings}

According to the American Civil Liberties Union, gun confiscation laws may “be a reasonable way to further public safety. To be constitutional, however, they must at a minimum have clear, nondiscriminatory criteria for defining persons as dangerous and a fair process for those affected to object and be heard by a court.”\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Shelby Arnold, Alisha Desai, & David DeMatteo, \textit{Keeping Guns Away from Potentially Dangerous People}, 49 Am. Psychol. Ass’n 27 (no. 8, 2018).
\item \textsuperscript{46} Louise Melling, Deputy Legal Director ACLU, Director of ACLU its Center for Liberty, \textit{The ACLU’s Position on Gun Control}, Mar. 26, 2018), \url{https://www.aclu.org/blog/mobilization/aclu-position-gun-control}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
A. Procedural due process standards

Constitutional requirements of procedural due process are at their height when an individual is deprived of a “fundamental” enumerated right. The right to keep and bear arms is such a right.47 Courts have identified seven key elements in procedural due process:

1. Notice
2. A neutral decision-maker
3. An opportunity to make an oral presentation
4. The opportunity to present evidence
5. The opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and respond to evidence
6. Right to representation by counsel
7. A decision based on the record, and reasoning for the result.48

As will be detailed in this Part II, an ex parte system deprives individuals of five of the seven elements of due process: notice, opportunity make an oral presentation, opportunity to present evidence, cross-examination and response to evidence, and the right to counsel.

As will also be detailed, even at a subsequent hearing, the GLCPGV/Bloomberg system continues to deprive the individual of due process, because the individual is not allowed to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Indeed, the adverse witnesses, including the accuser, never have to appear in court; they can submit affidavits instead.

B. Petitions should be filed after an investigation by law enforcement

In Connecticut, a confiscation petition may be filed only by law enforcement officers or a state’s attorney. Any person—including family members, former dating partners, neighbors, co-workers, and so on—can meet with law enforcement or a state’s attorney and request a petition. Then, officers or a state attorney must conduct their own investigation, moving forward with a petition if they find it warranted.49

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48 Rogen v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit’s list is drawn from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2010); McQuillen v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Davila, 573 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1978); McGhee V. Draper, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977); Childs v. United States Board of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
49 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c:

Seizure of firearms and ammunition from person posing risk of imminent personal injury to self or others. (a) Upon complaint on oath by any state’s attorney or assistant state’s attorney or by any two police officers, to any judge of the Superior Court, that
Indiana, only law enforcement may seek a confiscation order.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, Vermont requires that petitions must come from a state’s attorney or the office of the attorney general.\textsuperscript{51} Florida and Rhode Island likewise require that petitions come from law enforcement.\textsuperscript{52} Indeed, if an individual is too dangerous to possess a gun, law enforcement should always be notified as soon as possible. Depending on the circumstances, law enforcement may be able to arrest and detain the dangerous individual—a better outcome for public safety, since a dangerous individual who is at large can still perpetrate violent crimes with other weapons, or bare hands.

Gun control advocates argue that a very wide range of private persons should be allowed to file confiscation petitions. In the media, the advocates describe their position as favoring petitions by a “family or household member.” But their statutes define “household” and “family” so broadly that they include “dating partners.”\textsuperscript{53} They also cover any “blood” relative—apparently including cousins of any degree.\textsuperscript{54} A few jurisdictions go even further, allowing petitions from educators, school administrators, former roommates, mental health professionals, and co-workers.\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{itemize}
\item such state’s attorney or police officers have probable cause to believe that (1) a person poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals,
\item (2) such person possesses one or more firearms, and (3) such firearm or firearms are within or upon any place, thing or person, such judge may issue a warrant commanding a proper officer to enter into or upon such place or thing, search the same or the person and take into such officer’s custody any and all firearms and ammunition. Such state’s attorney or police officers shall not make such complaint unless such state’s attorney or police officers have conducted an independent investigation and have determined that such probable cause exists and that there is no reasonable alternative available to prevent such person from causing imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to others with such firearm.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{50} \textbf{IND. CODE} § 35-47-14-2.
\textsuperscript{51} \textbf{VT. STATS.} tit. 13 § 4053(a).
\textsuperscript{52} \textbf{FLA. STAT.} § 790.401; \textbf{R.I. GEN. LAWS} § 8-8.3-1 (“Petitioner means a law enforcement agency….”).
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{E.g.} \textbf{WASH. REV. CODE ANN.}, § 7.94.020(2) (“Family or household member” means, with respect to a respondent, any: (a) Person related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the respondent; (b) dating partners of the respondent;….”).
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Id.} Compare the (relatively) narrower definition in California law: “any spouse, whether by marriage or not, domestic partner, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household.” \textbf{CAL. PENAL CODE} §§ 422.4(b)(3), 18150(a)(2).

One new article presents a variant on expanding who can initiate the petitions. The article touts the new statute in New Mexico, whereby a wide range of people can ask law enforcement to file a petition. Gabriel A. Delaney & Jacob D. Charles, \textit{A Double-Filter Provision for Expanded Red Flag Laws: A Proposal for Balancing Rights and Risks in Preventing Gun Violence}, 48 \textit{JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS} 126 (2021). In the authors’ view, the New Mexico system is balanced, because law enforcement can serve as a check on malicious or factually weak petitions. But the New Mexico statute converts law enforcement into a purely ministerial function, subject to personal liability if they decided not to file a confiscation petition requested by anyone. See Part I.C. So the New Mexico law provides little quality control against improper petitions.

\textsuperscript{55} \textbf{D.C. STAT.} § 7-2510.01 (“mental health professional”), \textbf{HAW. STATS.} § 134-61 (“medical professional, educator, or colleague”); \textbf{Md. Code Ann.}, Pub. Safety § 5-601 (“physician, psychologist, clinical social worker, licensed clinical professional counselor, clinical nurse specialist in psychiatric and mental health nursing, psychiatric nurse practitioner, licensed clinical marriage or family
The wider the set of people who can petition, the greater the risk of malicious petitions. The best practice is to allow anyone to ask that law enforcement professionals file the petition; this provides the widest source of potential information, and can deter or filter out at least some frivolous or malicious petitions.

Some persons worry that if law enforcement officers are in charge of petitions, the officers will make up excuses not to follow up on a citizen’s request. The Connecticut experience indicates otherwise. Connecticut has a very high per capita rate of confiscation, even with the requirement that confiscation petitions must come from two law enforcement officers or state’s attorneys who have conducted an independent investigation.\textsuperscript{56}

C. Ex parte orders should be allowed only when there is a showing of good cause.

Ex parte orders are disfavored in law. Normally, when a petitioner seeks a temporary restraining order on an ex parte basis, the plaintiff must explain why the defendant was not notified of the hearing and must prove that there will be “immediate” injury if the order is not granted.\textsuperscript{57} If the court grants the order, the court must explain why it was necessary to issue the order ex parte.\textsuperscript{58}

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therapist, or health officer or designee of a health officer who has examined the individual...”), N.Y.

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C.P.L.R. § 6340 (“a school administrator” or designee of the administrator, including a “school teacher, school guidance counselor, school psychologist, school social worker, school nurse, or other school personnel required to hold a teaching or administrative license or certificate, and full or part-time compensated school employee required to hold a temporary coaching license or professional coaching certificate.”).


\footnotesize\textsuperscript{57} Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 65(b):
(b) Temporary Restraining Order.
(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{58} Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2):
Contents; Expiration. Every temporary restraining order issued without notice must state the date and hour it was issued; describe the injury and state why it is irreparable; state why the order was issued without notice; and be promptly filed in the clerk's office and entered in the record. The order expires at the time after entry—not to exceed 14 days—that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer extension. The reasons for an extension must be entered in the record.
Vermont has a better system: an ex parte confiscation order may be issued when “specific facts” show that “the respondent poses an imminent and extreme risk of causing harm.”\(^{59}\) This is superior to a system in which confiscation orders must always be issued ex parte, regardless of circumstances and facts.

When hearing motions for temporary restraining orders, judges sometimes decide that the most prudent course is to neither grant nor deny the order. Instead, a judge schedules a further hearing, perhaps one at which the defendant will have notice and the opportunity to be heard. Gun confiscation order statutes should give the judge a similar option to order a continuance after an ex parte hearing.

The usual purpose of temporary restraining orders is to preserve the status quo. But the GLCPGV/Bloomberg confiscation program is the opposite: it automatically sends law enforcement officers to a persons’ homes to confiscate their guns. When the facts of the particular case indicate a need for confiscation before the respondent can appear in court, the judge should be allowed to so order, based on specific findings.\(^{60}\)

**D. An “extreme risk protection order” should be about “extreme risks.”**

Mislabling has long been a problem in the gun control debate. For example, various bills about “assault weapons” have targeted BB guns, paintball guns, most handguns, almost all shotguns, and century-old low-power rifles.\(^{61}\) Today, the public is being told about “extreme risk protection orders.” But bills with this name are not limited to “extreme” risks.

While the bill titles say “extreme risk,” the text of the bills says the opposite. Rather than addressing “extreme risk,” Colorado’s law mandates confiscation based on a finding of a “significant risk.”\(^{62}\) Maybe a law about “significant” risk would be a good idea. But it would garner less public support than a bill about “extreme risk.” Similarly, in the 2019-20 Congress, S. 506 was titled the “Extreme Risk Protection Order Act of 2019.”\(^{63}\) But it allowed confiscations based on “a danger.”\(^{64}\)

In some states, such bills may violate the state constitution’s requirement that bills have a Clear Title—rather than a misleading title.\(^{65}\) Persons who believe in

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\(^{59}\) VT. STATS. tit. 13 § 4054.

\(^{60}\) Id. at § 4054(a)(2).


\(^{63}\) S. 506, § 1.

\(^{64}\) Id., § 4 (a)(3)(A)(ii), § 5 (1)(C). Likewise, the 2019 bill S. 7 was titled the “Extreme Risk Protection Order and Violence Prevention Act of 2019.” § 1. But it allowed confiscation for “a significant danger.” Id. at iii.

\(^{65}\) “No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title…” COLO. CONST., art. V, § 21. As the text indicates, the subject must be “clearly” expressed in the title. In re Breene, 14 Colo. 401, 406, 24 P. 3, 4 (1890)
confiscating guns based on “a significant risk”, or “a danger,” or some other standard should forthrightly say so, including in bill titles.

E. Telephonic testimony should be allowed only when there is a showing of good cause.

Under some confiscation laws, a petitioner does not need to show up in court, ever. Instead, he or she can testify by telephone. Thus, the judge is deprived of the ability to observe the petitioner’s demeanor, which is essential for a court to be able to make credibility judgments.66

As in other judicial proceedings, telephonic testimony should be allowed only when there is a specific showing of good cause in the individual case.67 There should be rigorous procedures to verify the identity of the person on the telephone who is claiming to be the petitioner or a witness for the petitioner. When telephonic testimony is allowed, the respondent should promptly be provided with a copy and transcript of the recording, so that the respondent can prepare his own case for the imminent court hearing.

F. Petition forms should not treat the exercise of constitutional rights as inherently suspicious.

Recently enacted confiscation laws contain a lengthy list of specific risk factors for courts evaluating confiscation orders. Such laws also direct the state court system to create standard forms for gun confiscation petitions. The listed risk factors are a

66 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.570(4) (if the petition is “filed by a law enforcement officer, the court may hold the hearing on the ex parte order by telephone, which must be recorded in the presence of the magistrate . . . by a certified court reporter or by electronic means.”); N.J. ADMIN. DIRECTIVE 19-19, GUIDELINE 3(c) (allowing petitioners to submit sworn oral testimony by “telephone, radio, or other means of electronic communication”); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.527(5)(b) (allowing the petitioner to appear by “electronic video transmission”).

“All of us know that, in every-day life, the way a man behaves when he tells a story—his intonations, his fidgetings or composure, his yawns, the use of his eyes, his air of candor or evasiveness—may furnish valuable clues to his reliability . . . . So the courts have concluded.” JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 21 (1950). Jerome Frank served on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (1941-57), as Commissioner and then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (1935-41), and before that was a leading scholar, favoring legal pragmatism. See generally Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, and a Romantic Pragmatism, 29 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & THE HUMANITIES 129 (2017).

67 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 43(a) (“For good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards...); Colo. Rev. Stats. § 13-14.5-103(4) (“The court may schedule a hearing by telephone pursuant to local court rules to reasonably accommodate a disability or, in exceptional circumstances, to protect a petitioner from potential harm. The court shall require assurances of the petitioner’s identity before conducting a telephonic hearing. A copy of the telephone hearing must be provided to the respondent prior to the hearing for an extreme risk protection order.”).
litany of trouble: recent acts or threats of violence, violation of a civil protection order, violation of previously-issued gun confiscation order (or sometimes, the mere existence of a terminated order), conviction of a domestic violence crime, reckless or unlawful use of firearms, history of unlawful violence, stalking, prior arrests, and drug or alcohol abuse.\textsuperscript{68} Mixed into the list of stigmatizers is the lawful exercise of constitutional rights: owning or acquiring firearms or ammunition.\textsuperscript{69} The fact that someone owns or recently acquired constitutionally-guaranteed items is of zero probative value in the assertion that the person is too dangerous to possess those items.

Thus, court forms tell the public and the courts that “ownership” of “a firearm” is in the same presumptively suspicious list of activities such as “stalking,” “credible threats of violence,” or conviction of “domestic violence.” Law-abiding gun owners understandably resent their activities being included in this litany.

Of course, gun confiscation orders should only be issued against persons who are reasonably believed to be in possession of guns, or about to acquire a gun. The bills can separately require a petitioner to identify, to the extent possible, the arms possessed by the respondent.\textsuperscript{70}

G. Standards of proof, continuances, and reasonable alternatives.

1. Standard of proof

Requiring “clear and convincing evidence” at an ex parte hearing is fair to petitioners. After all, the petitioner at an ex parte hearing enjoys the advantage of being able to present one-sided evidence to the court, with no opportunity for the court to consider contrary evidence. A petitioner with a solid case, and facing no contradiction, ought to be able to meet the clear and convincing standard. It is likewise fair that at an ex parte confiscation hearing, the petitioner should have to prove imminence, just as petitioners have to do for other temporary civil protection orders.\textsuperscript{71}

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\textsuperscript{68} WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.94.050, 7.94.040(3)(l) (“Any prior arrest of the respondent for a felony offense or violent crime”). Colorado goes even further, including arrest for some nonviolent misdemeanors. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-5-105(3)(i). Washington lists a violation of a prior confiscation order. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.040(3)(f). Colorado lists the mere existence any prior order, even a terminated one. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-5-105(3)(d).

\textsuperscript{69} Id. § 105(3)(f) & (l).

\textsuperscript{70} E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 18107 (“A petition for a gun violence restraining order shall describe the number, types, and locations of any firearms and ammunition presently believed by the petitioner to be possessed or controlled by the subject of the petition.”).

\textsuperscript{71} E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §13-14-104.5(7)(a) (“imminent danger exists”).
Connecticut’s confiscation law does require a finding of “probable cause” of imminent danger. Indiana and California do the same. The imminence requirement is appropriate, but the “probable cause” standard is too low.

Many other confiscation laws have an even lower standard. Washington requires the judge to issue an ex parte confiscation order based on “reasonable cause to believe that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to self or others in the near future.” Some states even allow an ex parte decision based on a preponderance of the evidence. This is an extremely low bar when only one side of a case is present in court and can present evidence.

2. Imminence

Massachusetts allows “reasonable cause” confiscation for alleged threats that are neither imminent nor in the near future. New York and the District of Columbia are the same. Proponents of gun confiscation orders say that their bills are modeled after domestic civil protection orders. But the norm is for civil protection orders to require proof of imminence.

3. Stronger standards at the two-party phase?

Some people favor low standards for ex parte orders, and a higher standard at a later hearing. This causes much trouble for innocent people. Errors are an inevitable consequence of a judge hearing only one side of the case and being forced to rule based on a too-low standard of evidence.

4. Let ex parte judges judge

Ex parte judges should have the option not to issue a confiscation order immediately, but instead to order a full hearing, with evidence from both sides. A judge might think that the evidence for a temporary confiscation order was borderline. Rather than having to grant or deny the petition immediately, the court could schedule a full hearing within a short time.

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72 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c(a) (“probable cause to believe…a person poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals”).
74 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.050(3) (2018). Other statutes with standards of “probable,” “good,” or “reasonable” cause are: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2510.02-04; FLA. STAT. § 790.401; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-64(f)); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/35(c), 67/40(c)); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-602); MASS. ANN. LAW. ch. 140 § 131R); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-23-24); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-2; N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 6340 et seq.; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-8.3-1 et seq.); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.13, et seq.).
75 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 140, § 131T(a) (“finds reasonable cause to conclude that the respondent poses a risk of bodily injury to self or others”).
76 N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 6342(a); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2510.02-04).
78 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401(3)(b) (2018) (“reasonable cause” at ex parte hearing; “clear and convincing” at contested hearing).
5. No reasonable alternative

At any hearing, Connecticut requires a determination that there is “no reasonable alternative” to the confiscation order. California does the same. So does Nevada. This is fair, since a prohibition on the exercise of constitutional rights should not be imposed when there are effective alternatives.

H. Right to counsel.

Sometimes government attorneys discourage people from having counsel, even at their own expense. A former Connecticut prosecutor explained how he talked respondents out of using lawyers:

It’s not a criminal matter; it is a civil matter. ... You [as a subject of gun removal] have an option. One, you can roll your dice with the hearing. Two, you can say to me [as the State’s lawyer] right now, “I am not comfortable going forward without an attorney.” And I will go up and tell the judge you would like counsel. And [you] would be told, “We are not going to have the hearing [now] and you’re not going to get the guns back.” And then [people think] “Oh, I’m going to have to pay for an attorney now to get my guns back?” [So the hearing goes forward.] That happens most of the time ... I would then go into chambers and lay it out for the judge exactly what we talked about. I would say, “Look, I think this guy is a good guy,” or “I think this guy is a borderline guy.”

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79 CONN. GEN. STATS. § 29-38c(a) (“Such state’s attorney or police officers shall not make such complaint unless such state’s attorney or police officers have conducted an independent investigation and have determined that such probable cause exists and that there is no reasonable alternative available to prevent such person from causing imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to others with such firearm.”)

80 CAL. PENAL CODE § 18175(b):

(b) At the hearing, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that both of the following are true:

(1) The subject of the petition, or a person subject to an ex parte gun violence restraining order, as applicable, poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, owning, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition.

(2) A gun violence restraining order is necessary to prevent personal injury to the subject of the petition, or the person subject to an ex parte gun violence restraining order, as applicable, or another because less restrictive alternatives either have been tried and found to be ineffective, or are inadequate or inappropriate for the circumstances of the subject of the petition, or the person subject to an ex parte gun violence restraining order, as applicable.

81 NEV. REV. STATS. § 33.500 et seq.

82 Quoted in Swanson et al., supra note 31, at 196.
Colorado has taken steps to prevent such abuse, by making court-appointed counsel available to all respondents.\(^83\)

As Colorado recognizes, having to suddenly find a lawyer and pay the fees for an imminent court hearing can be very difficult for many people, including people who are not legally indigent but who do not have several thousand dollars available to pay attorneys’ fees. Of course the respondent can choose a different lawyer instead, at his own expense.

A good system of court-appointed counsel will encourage some attorneys to develop expertise in gun confiscation cases. Such attorneys will provide useful knowledge for future improvements to confiscation systems.

Statutes should clearly specify how respondents are to be given clear written notice of their right to counsel, as well their procedural and property rights. Federal funding can encourage states to broaden the availability of court-appointed counsel.

I. Right of cross-examination.

According to the Supreme Court, cross-examination “is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”\(^84\) But some statutes eradicate the right of cross-examination. The accuser and witnesses supporting the accuser never need to testify in court, where they would be subject to cross-examination. Instead, persons can simply submit an affidavit.\(^85\)

In the GLCPGV/Bloomberg model, the petitioner need never be seen by a judge or opposing counsel. The petitioner can make a telephone call in an ex parte hearing. At the later hearing, where the respondent can present his or her side of the story, the petitioner can send a written document, instead of testifying. This makes a sham of due process. An attorney who cannot cross-examine adverse witnesses cannot function effectively.\(^86\)

\(^83\) \textsc{Colo. Rev. Stats.} § 13-14.5-104(1)/


\(^85\) \textit{E.g., Colo. Rev. Stats.} § 13-14.5-105(4) “(The court may: (a) examine under oath the petitioner, the respondent, and any witnesses they may produce, or, in lieu of examination, consider sworn affidavits of the petitioner, the respondent, and any witnesses they may produce;”).

\(^86\) Gun confiscation hearings are styled as civil processes, not criminal ones, so some persons may believe that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply. The Sixth Amendment guarantees: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” \textsc{U.S. Const.}, amend. VI.
J. Venue should be where the respondent lives

Some statutes allow venue where the respondent resides or where the resident has a firearm. The latter is inappropriate. Consider a respondent who lives in Denver and stores a gun there; he also stores two deer rifles at a friend’s hunting cabin in Moffat County, 200 miles west in the mountains. He should be allowed to present his legal defense in Denver, where he lives—and not forced into a far-away venue.

88 Colorado’s HB 19-1197 was amended to remove this problem.

K. Concealed carry restoration for the falsely accused

Confiscation laws sometimes require that a concealed carry permit be revoked immediately when a temporary order is entered. If the court terminates a temporary order after the court hears the respondent’s side of the story, the concealed carry permit should be promptly reissued.

In many jurisdictions, carry permits are expensive and time-consuming. Innocent people who have been vindicated in court should not have to spend several months and pay high fees to re-apply for a carry permit all over again. Without...
prompt reissuance of permits, innocent persons are denied their right to bear arms for an extended period of time.

Similar procedures should be followed in the few states where a license is required to possess a firearm or a handgun in the home.91

**L. Civil remedy for malicious and false petitions.**

Laws about child abuse, sexual assault, and domestic violence are sometimes used as weapons by spurned lovers and by people seeking revenge for various motives. There is no reason to believe people who pervert the law by making false reports will somehow be more scrupulous regarding the new confiscation tool.

Many confiscation laws specifically declare that malicious or false petitions may be subject to prosecution.92 This is appropriate. But the odds of criminal prosecution are minuscule, even if an affidavit is sworn under penalty of perjury. Perjury prosecutions are rare, and rarer still from civil cases.93

Victims of abusive claims should be entitled to attorney’s fees, and they should have a cause of action of civil damages. Without a strong civil remedy, there is little practical deterrent to malicious reports.

**M. Case law supports the principle that manifestly dangerous persons may be disarmed.**

A thoughtful article in the *Virginia Law Review* by Joseph Blocher and Jacob Charles argues in favor of the constitutionality of gun confiscation orders.94 First, as the article points out, the Supreme Court’s *Heller* precedent, like many precedents involving state constitution rights to arms, allow for the disarming of people who are not the “law-abiding, responsible citizens” extolled in *Heller*.

In analyzing original public meaning, several historical practices are precedents for the practice. Some American colonies had laws prohibiting gun possession by

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91 See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 400.00(2) ("A license for a pistol or revolver, other than an assault weapon or a disguised gun, shall be issued to . . . have and possess [a handgun] in his dwelling by a householder").

92 E.g., MD. PUB. SAFETY § 5-609.


slaves, or only allowing possession while under the master’s supervision.95 The first gun licensing laws in the United States were those imposed on enslaved persons or on free persons of color.96

Second, almost every colony had laws that attempted (usually with little success) to prohibit arms trade to hostile Indian nations.97 At the time, the various Indian tribes were recognized as genuinely separate nations; a Seneca Indian, for example, had no more duty of allegiance to the British colonies or to the United States than did a French citizen who lived in Paris.98 All nations attempt to restrict arms provision to hostile foreign nations.

As for Indians who did accept living in the Anglo-American polity, some state or colonial laws did attempt to limit arms possession; these restrictions were loosened or removed in the various colonies or states as the threat of Indian warfare diminished.99

Finally, during the Revolution several states confiscated for public use the firearms of people who would not swear loyalty to the United States.100

Blocher and Charles, however, do not rely on the above precedents, some of which bear the taint of racial animus.

Arguing for the constitutionality of pre-hearing deprivations of rights, Blocher and Charles point to a litany of cases allowing ex parte seizure of commercial property or revocation of commercial licenses.101 These examples, however, are not on point. None of them involve deprivations based on predictions of future danger growing out of lawful conduct. Rather, all of them demonstrated illegality before the order is issued. For example, a vendor has chickens that are presently contaminated are therefore

95 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 117-18 (Virgil Maxcy ed., 1811) (enacted 1715) (“[N]o negro or other slave, within this province, shall be permitted to carry any gun or any other offensive Weapon, from off their master’s Land, without licence from their said Master.”); 19 (pt. 1) THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 76-78, 117-18 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1904) (1755 statute, and 1768 revision) (forbidding slave possession or carrying of “Fire Arms or any Offensive Weapon whatsoever,” unless the slave had written permission from his or her master, mistress, or overseer to hunt; also allowing slaves to carry guns without written permission when accompanied by a white of at least 16 years old, or when hunting destructive birds on their master’s plantation during daytime; no slaves could have arms between sunset Saturday and sunrise Monday).

96 See, e.g., State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844) (gun licensing statute for free blacks); Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 447, 449 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824) (the “numerous restrictions imposed upon this class of people”—free blacks—such as the limits “upon their right to bear arms,” are “inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, both of this state and of the United States.” Accordingly, the state and federal constitutions do not apply to them); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to Be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence? 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1307, 1318-23 (1995).


99 JOHNSON et al., supra.

100 JOHNSON et al., supra, at 279-80.

101 See Blocher & Charles, supra note 94.
illegal at present to sell; the chickens may be seized ex parte.\textsuperscript{102} Or a mine is currently being operated in violation of safety laws; an ex parte order may suspend operation of the mine.\textsuperscript{103} A commercial truck has repeatedly been found guilty of violating driving laws; his license may be suspended ex parte.\textsuperscript{104} Notably, none of the ex parte cases cited by Blocher and Charles involve enumerated constitutional rights.

Challenges to state confiscation laws have been rejected by three intermediate courts of appeals. None of the cases involved the procedural due process questions discussed in this testimony.

\section*{1. State v. Hope (Conn. App.)}

The first case came from the Appellate Court of Connecticut.\textsuperscript{105} On appeal, the respondent had no attorney.\textsuperscript{106} He was obviously mentally ill; “the plaintiff had brought to the hearing two electronic devices wrapped in tin foil.”\textsuperscript{107}

He raised no constitutional claims other than the Second Amendment.\textsuperscript{108} The court speedily rejected the Second Amendment argument. The law “does not restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of their homes. It restricts for up to one year the rights of only those whom a court has adjudged to pose a risk of imminent physical harm to themselves or others after affording due process protection to challenge the seizure of the firearms.”\textsuperscript{109}

Since the plaintiff in \textit{Hope} raised only the Second Amendment, \textit{Hope} offers no precedent on constitutional due process. Cases with pro se mentally ill plaintiffs do not benefit from well-presented adversarial argument, and therefore offer limited guidance to future courts.

\section*{2. Redington v. State (Ind. App.)}

An Indiana case involved a plaintiff who was at least represented by counsel.\textsuperscript{110} The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Indiana confiscation statute violated the Indiana constitutional right to arms. Indiana precedent allowed prohibiting “dangerous” persons from having arms.\textsuperscript{111}

Secondly, the plaintiff argued that the seizure of his guns was a “taking” of his property, for which compensation is required by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Indiana Constitution. The court responded that the taking of dangerous property does not require compensation; for example, forfeiture laws allow uncompensated takings.\textsuperscript{112}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} See N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
\item \textsuperscript{103} See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 298 (1981).
\item \textsuperscript{104} See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977).
\item \textsuperscript{105} Hope v. Connecticut, 163 Conn. App. 36 (2016).
\item \textsuperscript{106} Id. at 36 (“Donald Hope, self-represented, West Hartford, the appellan t (plaintiff).”).
\item \textsuperscript{107} Id. at 40.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Id. at 38 n.1.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Id. at 43.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. App. 2013).
\item \textsuperscript{111} Id. at 834-35.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Id. at 836-37.
\end{itemize}
Third, the plaintiff argued that a particular phrase in the statute was void for vagueness. The court held that the phrase was not vague, because it was qualified by another phrase.\textsuperscript{113}

Redington’s 51 guns were confiscated in 2012, and the confiscation upheld in 2013. In 2015 he filed a petition for their return. There was no hearing on the petition until 2018. Under the Indiana statute, he faced the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence to show that he “is not dangerous.”\textsuperscript{114} At the hearing, Redington presented uncontradicted testimony from a psychiatrist, a counselor, and his wife that Redington was nonviolent and nondangerous, as of 2018. The state presented no evidence. Relying solely on the 2012 confiscation order, the trial court denied Redington’s petition. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, because the issue in 2018 was whether Redington was potentially dangerous in 2018, rather than in 2012. Indeed, “If the State’s position were correct, the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to Redington because the Redington I decision that the statute passed constitutional muster would have been based on the false promise that he could someday regain possession of his firearms.”\textsuperscript{115}

3. \textit{Davis v. Gilchrest County Sheriff’s Office (Fla. App.)}

A county sheriff’s office filed a confiscation petition against one of its deputies. The trial court issued the order based on evidence that Davis had expressed homicidal ideation and had threatened to shoot another deputy.\textsuperscript{116} The appellate court rejected Davis’s claims that the trial court had improperly sequestered a witness,\textsuperscript{117} and rejected Davis’s claim that his trial presentation had been cut short, as Davis’s attorney had not asked for a continuance.\textsuperscript{118} Constitutional vagueness challenges to the statutory terms “significant danger,” “relevant evidence,” and “mental illness” were rejected.\textsuperscript{119}

Finally, the court considered Gilchrest’s facial challenge that the law violated substantive due process because it allowed confiscation for “entirely innocent” activity. As the court noted, being seriously mentally ill, abusing alcohol, or recently acquiring firearms and ammunition may be entirely innocent.\textsuperscript{120} “Importantly, these

\textsuperscript{113} The phrase was “may present a risk of personal injury to the individual or to another individual in the future.” That phrase was qualified by the requirement that the petitioner prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual either “(A) has a mental illness (as defined in IC 12–7–2–130) that may be controlled by medication, and has not demonstrated a pattern of voluntarily and consistently taking the individual’s medication while not under supervision; or (B) is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to a reasonable belief that the individual has a propensity for violent or emotionally unstable conduct.” \textit{Id.} at 839.

\textsuperscript{114} INDIANAPOLIS CODE § 35-47-14-8(d)(2).


\textsuperscript{116}\textit{Davis v. Gilchrest County Sheriff’s Office}, 280 So.3d 524, 528-29 (Fla. App. 2019).

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Id.} at 530.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id.} at 531.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Id.} at 531-32.

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Id.} at 532-33.
are simply factors, among many a court may consider (none of which were relied upon in this case) before issuing an RPO.”

III. Enforcement issues

A. Safe and orderly relinquishment of firearms.

In Vermont, a person served with a confiscation order must immediately relinquish his or her firearms to law enforcement or to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL, a licensed gun business, such as a retail store). Alternatively, the court may order the firearms be given to a third person. The third person must be someone who is lawfully allowed to own guns, must not allow respondent access to the guns, and may not return the guns to respondent until the order is terminated.

Oregon requires that the respondent “Within 24 hours surrender all deadly weapons in the respondent’s custody, control or possession to a law enforcement agency, a gun dealer or a third party who may lawfully possess the deadly weapons.” In Washington, if the respondent was present at the hearing, he or she has 48 hours to surrender all firearms.

But other statutes automatically force law enforcement to show up at someone’s home and take their guns. The first notice that a person will receive is when the police arrive at a person’s home and announce: “We’re from the government and we’re here to confiscate your guns.”

This creates an inflammatory situation, endangering both law enforcement and the public. Undoubtedly there are situations where instant confiscation without notice is necessary; laws can so provide, based on specific judicial findings about an individual case.

Since about 30 percent of temporary orders turn out to be incorrect, mandatory instant police confiscation puts many innocent people through a humiliating experience for no good reason. It evokes a police state.

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121 Id. at 533.
122 VT. STAT. tit. 13 § 4059(b)(1).
123 VT. STAT. tit. 13 § 4059(b)(2).
124 OR. STATS. § 166.537(1). “If the respondent indicates an intention to surrender the deadly weapons to a gun dealer or a third party, the law enforcement officer shall request that the respondent identify the gun dealer or third party.” Id. § 166.537(3)(a).
125 “Alternatively, if personal service by a law enforcement officer is not possible, or not required because the respondent was present at the extreme risk protection order hearing, the respondent shall surrender the firearms in a safe manner to the control of the local law enforcement agency within forty-eight hours of being served with the order by alternate service or within forty-eight hours of the hearing at which the respondent was present.” WASH. STATS. § 7.94.090.
126 Discussing a case in which a Connecticut judge improperly retained firearms that had been unlawfully seized, a police officer explained: “Firearms owners especially feel put-upon. I don’t think the legislature, I don’t think the judiciary realizes how, how strongly offended people are by that .... These are people that have trust in the system .... These are people that support the police, were in the military...I mean, that’s who these people are. And then they come up with stuff like this, their
B. No-Knock Raids

No-knock raids must be the exception and not the norm. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that an entire class of cases can automatically be no-knock at unfettered law enforcement discretion.\textsuperscript{127} Although no-knock raids may be necessary in unusual circumstances, their routine use to execute search warrants endangers the public and law enforcement.\textsuperscript{128} They are characteristic of a militarized police state, not a civil republic.

States regulate no-knocks in various ways. For example, in Colorado, no-knocks require a judicial warrant issued at the request of a district attorney.\textsuperscript{129} But Colorado’s new confiscation law was written to negate this requirement for GCOs.\textsuperscript{130}

Confiscation statutes should specify that no-knock GCO must comply with all of the state’s rules for no-knocks. Any law that directly or indirectly makes no-knocks easier for gun searches and seizures than for other searches and seizures is discriminatory.

States should not exempt GCO confiscations from the ordinary limits on no-knock raids. Laws should allow respondents to peaceably surrender their arms within a certain period, unless the court makes a finding of the necessity of immediate forcible confiscation. Violent seizures should be allowed only in cases of necessity when specifically authorized by a court, or in exigent circumstances that could not have been presented to the court.

More broadly, law enforcement officers should not be put in the position of having to forcibly confiscate firearms based on a court order for which the petitioner never even appeared in court, which can be obtained by a jilted dating partner, and for which the accuser’s claims were never verified or investigated by law enforcement. Forcing law enforcement officers to enter someone’s house based on potentially dubious and low credibility claims recklessly endangers officers and the public. Yet this dangerous system is exactly what the new Colorado statute mandates, following the model created by gun control lobbies.

At the Uniform Law Commission study group meeting, discussed in Part 1.B, I suggested that no-knock raids should be allowed when needed, but should not be authorized as routine. Mr. Chipman, representing the GLCPGV, answered that we should not tell law enforcement officers how to do their jobs. However, the Fourth

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\textsuperscript{129} COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-1061. There is an exception for exigent circumstances. \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{130} COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-106.
and Fifth Amendments, judicial precedents thereunder, and many statutes do in fact control how law enforcement officers do their jobs, especially in situations where law enforcement officers may use violence.¹³¹

C. Custody of seized firearms

In Connecticut and Florida, where the police must always personally confiscate guns, guns may then be transferred to an appropriate third person.¹³² As the statutes specify, custodians must themselves be lawfully allowed to own guns, must not allow respondent access to the guns, and may not return the guns to respondent until the order is terminated.

Other states, though, allow the guns to be transferred only to a Federal Firearms Licensee.¹³³ Colorado in general allows transfers only to FFLs, but allows “curios and relics” to be transferred to a relative who does not live with respondent.¹³⁴

To reduce the risk that stored firearms will be ruined by neglect, and to reduce the humiliation of innocent people, statutes should allow firearms to be stored by any responsible lawful adult who will not allow access to the arms while an order is in effect.

When firearms are in law enforcement custody, the custodians should have the obligation to store them properly, and to pay damages for improper storage.¹³⁵

As California firearms attorney Don Kilmer writes, “Local governments are now charging people thousands of dollars to store guns that are confiscated, and they tack on a charge for inventory and processing fees. In one case in Southern California, a

¹³¹ Mr. Chipman was a SWAT agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms involved in the attack on the Branch Davidian home in Waco, Texas, in February 1993. As congressional hearings and other evidence later demonstrated, the reckless violent attack on the home led to the deaths of six Branch Davidians and four BATF agents. The attack was completely unnecessary. It was well-known that the subject of arrest warrant, Vernon Wayne Howell, often went jogging, and he could have been arrested while doing so. BATF’s choice to launch the violent assault seemed to be an attempt to create publicity for itself to distract from accusations of sexual harassment against female agents. DAVID B. KOPEL & PAUL BLACKMAN, NO MORE WACOS: WHAT’S WRONG WITH FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND HOW TO FIX IT (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1997).

¹³² CONN. GEN. STATS, § 29-38c(e) (“Any person whose firearm or firearms and ammunition have been ordered seized pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, or such person’s legal representative, may transfer such firearm or firearms and ammunition in accordance with the provisions of section 29-33 or other applicable state or federal law, to any person eligible to possess such firearm or firearms and ammunition.”).

¹³³ This is a deviation from normal Colorado law. Ordinary restraining orders that involve firearms allow a transfer to a private party. COLO. REV. STATS, § 13-14-105.5.

¹³⁴ “Curios and relics” are certain historic firearms, defined in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. The curios statute is COLO. REV. STATS., § 13-14.5-108(III).

¹³⁵ For problems caused by improper storage by law enforcement in other contexts, see, e.g., Wright v. Beck, 723 Fed. App’x 391 (9th Cir. 2017) (city seized hundreds of plaintiff’s lawfully-owned firearms, eventually returned 26, and destroyed the rest); Wright v. Beck, No. 2:15-cv-05805-R-PJW, 2019 WL 404417 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2019); Emily Miller, D.C. police damage soldier’s guns, WASH. TIMES, June 17, 2012.
client had to pay a $1,000 ransom, that was reduced from an initial “offer” of $4,000, to get his 50-gun collection back.”\textsuperscript{136}

\section*{D. Duration of orders}

An ex parte order should be valid for no more than one week. A longer order should be allowed only after a full hearing with the petitioner having the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent should be represented by counsel, able to present evidence, and able to cross-examine.

Longer orders should extend no more than 180 days. Six months is sufficient for alternative proceedings, such as mental health commitments, or criminal prosecution. During the term of an order, the respondent should have the opportunity to petition for lifting of the order.

\section*{IV. Termination of Orders}

Orders should expire on a specific date. Renewal of the order should be allowed if the petitioner proves the case for a renewal by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing with notice and due process.\textsuperscript{137}

Except for Connecticut, state laws allow the restricted party to request a hearing to terminate the order. Most states allow the petitioner to request that the order be extended once the initial period has concluded.\textsuperscript{138}

\section*{A. Preventing federal lifetime bans.}

Upon termination of an order, information in databases should be revised to so indicate. In particular, the order should be removed from the National Instant Check System, where it is used as a firearms prohibitor. Unless the terminated order is removed from NICS, then an expired six-month or one-year order could function as a lifetime prohibition.

Federal agents should not be allowed to bootstrap expired orders into lifetime bans. Confiscation hearings are not criminal trials. A confiscation order is not based on the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike involuntary commitment hearings, confiscation hearings are not a mental health adjudication.

\textsuperscript{136} Donald Kilmer, The enforcement problems with gun-grabbing ‘red flag’ laws are even worse than you think, WASH. EXAMINER, Aug. 17, 2019.
\textsuperscript{137} E.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 18190.
\textsuperscript{138} Except for Indiana and New Jersey, where confiscation orders are permanent until lifted at the request of a petition from the respondent, who must affirmatively prove that he is not dangerous.
However, aggressive federal officials might scour state confiscation records, and declare that certain respondents are federally prohibited persons. For example, if a confiscation case record shows that the respondent was having mental health problems, a federal official could declare that the respondent has been “adjudicated as a mental defective.” Therefore, the respondent is banned by federal law for life from possessing firearms. Similar issues arise under the drug use prohibitor in federal firearms law, which has been applied even to medical use in compliance with state law.

Federal laws and state laws should prohibit terminated confiscation orders from being used as a basis for federal gun bans.

B. Return procedures.

There should be specific rules for mandatory return of arms that have been seized, once the order expires or is overturned. Law enforcement agencies sometimes refuse to return firearms to lawful owners, and courts sometimes allow it—typically under the theory that people’s rights are not violated if they can legally acquire new firearms. A strict deadline and a civil cause of action, including attorney’s fees and punitive damages for failure to return lawful arms, should be part of a fair statute. Governments should not be allowed to charge the owners storage “fees” for temporarily confiscated guns—a common abuse in California, where fees can be exorbitant.

V. Conclusion

Gun confiscation orders are legitimate tools for public safety when they are applied to persons who pose an extreme, imminent risk of misusing a firearm. Lawmakers should aim to reduce the high error rate of ex parte orders, and to ensure protection of due process at every step. States should provide careful controls on ex parte proceedings and appointed counsel for all respondents. States should not forbid cross-examination, promote unnecessary no-knock raids, leave innocent victims without a civil remedy for false or malicious petitions, or deny any of the seven core elements of due process.

The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution can properly exercise its jurisdiction by encouraging states to enact or revise GCO statutes to adhere to best practices.