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January-March 2010 Archive
Outstanding
new film,
premiered at
the Cato
Institute
last week. Watch
it here.
Lots of
useful
advice for
law-abiding
citizens
about how to
properly
exercise
their rights
to refuse
searches
that are not
based on
warrants or
probable
cause, and
other
efforts to
trick
citizens
into waiving
their
rights.
Categories:
Fourth
Amendment
My 23 minute
podcast
interview
with
Colorado
Attorney
Geneeral
John Suthers
is
here.
Categories:
Uncategorized
Chapman Law
School
professor
Hugh Hewitt
runs an
excellent
blog, with
plenty of
stimulating
commentary,
even for
people who
disagree
with Hugh’s
viewpoint.
Some people,
however,
were put off
by Hugh’s
adamant
defense of
the Supreme
Court
nomination
of Harriet
Miers.
Discerning
readers have
learned to
take Hugh’s
prediction
of
Republican
election
wins with
many grains
of salt. But
now I feel
compelled to
speak out at
something
that has
long been a
problem on
Hugh’s blog,
and which
just went
far over
the line.
Although
Hugh is
currently a
Californian,
he grew up
in Ohio, and
so he uses
his blog and
his national
radio
program to
promote his
endless
enthusiasm
for Ohio
sports
teams,
predicting
(not always
accurately)
victories by
the
Cleveland
Browns and
so on. As an
Ohio man,
Hugh also
enjoys
taunting
Michigan,
which is one
of the
things that
Ohioans have
long done to
keep
themselves
amused.
Fine, if
that’s what
makes him
happy. But
Hugh is also
a member of
the
University
of Michigan
Law School
class of
1983. Today,
he
celebrated
the victory
of the Miami
of Ohio
hockey team
over the
University
of Michigan,
in the final
game of the
NCAA
regional
tournament.
If he wants
to rejoice
when the
University
of Toledo
defeats
Eastern
Michigan
University,
that’s his
privilege.
But to root
against–and
to rejoice
in the
defeat
of–one’s own
alma
mater
seems to me
very wrong.
There
must be some
conservative
principle
about being
loyal to the
institution
that
provided you
with a fine
education
and helped
make your
professional
success
possible. I
am sure that
Edmund Burke
would never
have gloated
over the
defeat of
the Trinity
College
football
team or the
Middle
Temple
hockey team,
if those
great
institutions
had football
and hockey
teams.
Tags:
Hugh Hewitt
That’s the
title of a
new article
which I have
just
submitted
en masse
to law
reviews.
[Note: the
full text
hasn’t yet
appeared on
SSRN. So
here’s a
link to
the full
text via
Berkeley
Electronic
Press.]
Here’s the
abstract:
Currently,
the
United
Nations
is
drafting
an Arms
Trade
Treaty
to
impose
strict
controls
on
firearms
and
other
weapons.
In
support
of hasty
adoption
of the
Treaty,
a
UN-related
organization
of
Treaty
supporters
is has
produced
a report
claiming
that
armed
violence
is
responsible
for
740,000
deaths
annually.
This
Article
carefully
examines
the
claim.
We find
that the
claim is
based on
dubious
assumptions,
cherry-picking
data,
and
mathematical
legerdemain
which is
inexplicably
being
withheld
from the
public.
The
refusal
to
disclose
the
mathematical
calculations
used to
create
the
740,000
factoid
is
itself
cause
for
serious
suspicion;
our own
calculations
indicate
that the
740,000
figure
is far
too high.
Further,
while
the
report
claims
that 60%
of
homicides
are
perpetrated
with
firearms,
our
review
of the
data on
which
report
claimed
to rely
yields a
22%
rate.
The
persons
responsible
for the
report
have
refused
to
release
their
homicide
calculations,
or any
other
calculations.
This
Article
also
shows
how a
narrow
focus on
restricting
firearms
ownership
continues
to
distract
international
attention
from
life-saving,
viable
solutions.
We
propose
some
practical
alternatives
which
have
already
saved
lives in
war-ravaged
areas.
My
co-authors
on this
Article, as
with many of
my
international
law
articles,
are Dr. Paul
Gallant and
Dr. Joanne
Eisen, who
are Senior
Fellows at
the
Independence
Institute.
Tags:
Arms Trade
Treaty,
Global Burden of
Armed Violence,
United Nations
David Kopel • March
22, 2010 8:05 pm
One source of the impending
constitutional challenge to the
Obamacare mandate is that exceeds
the enumerated powers granted to
Congress under Article I, section 8.
For example, that the people’s grant
to power to Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states
does not include the power to compel
people to engage in commerce. Jack
Balkin,
writing in the New England Journal
of Medicine, has two responses:
1. Yes it does, because of
Wickard and Raich,
since people without insurance will
eventually get sick and then buy
health services; and allowing these
people to buy health services
outside the congressional system
would undermine the congressional
regulation. 2. The mandate is
structured as a tax. For the
moment, let’s put aside the question
of whether the Obamacare tax is an
Article I tax, or a 16th Amendment
income tax. Does Congress have the
infinite power to control people’s
behavior (such as by ordering them
to engage in commercial
transactions) via the tax power? I
suggest not. When the Bill of Rights
was being debated in front of
Congress, the skeptical Rep.
Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts
asked if there should also be an
enumeration that “declared that a
man should have a right to wear his
hat if he pleased; that he might get
up when he pleased, and go to bed
when he thought proper.” 1 Annals of
Congress 759–60 (Aug. 15, 1789).
Sedgewick’s point was that national
laws about bedtimes and hat-wearing
were self-evidently beyond the
authority of Congress.
However, if the tax power means
that Congress can order citizens to
buy something they don’t want to
buy, why does Congress not have the
power to assess taxes on people who
get too little sleep, or too much
sleep, and thereby harm their own
health and the public fisc? Or who
wear hats so little that they
increase their risk of skin cancer?
Or who wear hats so often that they
dangerously reduce their levels of
vitamin D? In
Sonzinsky v. United States
(1937), the Supreme Court declared
that it would not inquire into
hidden regulatory motives that might
have motivated a tax. But in
Sonzinsky, the underlying activity
(running a for-profit commercial
business selling machine guns) was
unquestionably within the scope of
commercial activities that might be
subject to an excise tax.
In contrast, not buying
health insurance is not in its
nature a commercial taxable
activity. Neither is wearing a hat,
or getting up when you please, or
going to bed when you think it
proper.
Sonzinsky is deferential
to congressional motives, but it
does nothing to support the claim
that non-commercial activity may be
taxed. Construing the tax power as
less than infinite–as not
encompassing the power to tax
bedtimes or the decision not
purchase a product–is strongly
supported by the Ninth Amendment.
This is so whether one agrees with
Randy Barnett’s view of the
Ninth Amendment (as an enforceable
guarantee of natural rights) or with
Kurt Lash’s (as a rule that
enumerated powers should be narrowly
construed so as not to violate
natural rights, including the right
of self-government in the states).
Finally, as Jack Balkin has
ably argued, “Constitutional
change occurs because Americans
persuade each other about the best
meaning of constitutional text and
principle in their own time. These
debates and political struggles help
generate Americans’ investment in
the Constitution as their
Constitution and they create a
platform for the possibility � but
not the certainty of its redemption
in history.”
Americans today are not bound to
meekly accept the most far-ranging
assertions of congressional power
based on large extrapolations from
Supreme Court cases that themselves
come from a short period (the late
1930s and early 1940s) when the
Court was more supine and submissive
to claims about centralized power
than was any other Supreme Court
before or after in our history.
American citizens, in the political
process and in their personal lives,
will ultimately have the final word
on the Constitution.
A large and permanent majority of
the American people immediately
accepted Social Security as a
constitutional solution to poverty
among the elderly and to massive
unemployment (since Social Security
would open up jobs by encouraging
people to retire sooner). The
American people have not accepted
Obamacare as a constitutional
solution to health insurance
problems. If the American believe
that there is a “crisis” about the
high cost of health insurance, then
the American people can also believe
that the solution is not to punish
people for refusing to buy
overpriced insurance that they don’t
want. The American people can reject
the notion that our Constitution
should be contorted and distorted to
accommodate such a destructive and
intrusive scheme.
It is eminently within the
authority of We the People to act
politically on our constitutional
beliefs that the congressional power
to regulate interstate commerce does
not extend to forcing people to buy
a product which Congress has
forbidden to be sold across state
lines; that the power to regulate
interstate commerce is not the power
to compel a person to participate in
instrastate commerce; and the that
power to levy income or excise taxes
does not include the power to impose
punishment in the form of punitive
taxes on persons who choose not to
buy something–or who choose whether
to wear hats and when to sleep.
p.s. PENNumbra had a good debate
on the topic last fall,
featuring Jack Balkin vs. Lee Casey
& David Rivkin.
Tags:
Jack Balkin
Received the Royal Assent and
thereby became law on this day, in
1765. A spontaneous citizen
movement,
reinforced by state governments
carrying out their duties to protect
the constitutional rights and
liberties of their citizens,
mobilized to oppose the Stamp Act.
They were told by their betters that
repeal would never take place, and
that they might as well accept what
had been imposed. Although they
succeeded in having the Stamp Act
repealed, rather than just modified,
Parliament came back a few years
later with the Tea Act–which of
course led to the activists getting
the “Tea Party” name. The first Tea
Party and its state government
allies did not surrender, and
eventually they prevailed. I don’t
think that their 21st-century
descendants will cease their efforts
until they too have succeeded.
Tags:
Obamacare,
Stamp Act
Danielle Citron
Last year, Maryland law
professor Danielle
Citron published “Cyber
Civil Rights” in the BU Law
Review. Here’s the abstract:
Social networking sites and
blogs have increasingly become
breeding grounds for anonymous
online groups that attack women,
people of color, and members of
other traditionally
disadvantaged groups. . . .
Attackers manipulate search
engines to reproduce their lies
and threats for employers and
clients to see, creating digital
“scarlet letters” that ruin
reputations.
. . . .
General criminal statutes and
tort law proscribe much of the
mobs’ destructive behavior, but
the harm they inflict also ought
to be understood and addressed
as civil rights violations.
Civil rights suits reach the
societal harm that would
otherwise go unaddressed and
would play a crucial expressive
role. Acting against these
attacks does not offend First
Amendment principles when they
consist of defamation, true
threats, intentional infliction
of emotional distress,
technological sabotage, and
bias-motivated abuse aimed to
interfere with a victim’s
employment opportunities. To the
contrary, it helps preserve
vibrant online dialogue and
promote a culture of political,
social, and economic equality.
Citron’s article detailed some
particular cases of such abuses. As
she acknowledged, the mob actions
are solidly within the scope of
existing criminal law and tort law.
Nevertheless, she made the case that
federal civil rights laws should be
revised to cover Internet threats
and defamation–since civil rights
statutes provide attorney’s fees for
a successful plaintiff, and since
prosecutors would be more likely to
bring criminal charges if the
underlying offense has a civil
rights association. She arguds that
“Just as changing circumstances
justified curtailing the right of
contracts in the 1930s, today’s
networked environment warrants a
rejection of free speech
absolutism.”
Citron also proposed that website
operators be civilly liable for the
content of postings on their
websites (by means of an exception
to 47 U.S.C. § 230, the immunity
statute), and that operators be
required to collect and maintains
ISP logs for all posters.
Last fall, the Denver University
Law Review held a symposium about
Citron’s proposal, featuring
commentary from 11 scholars, plus a
response from Citron. Rather than
being required to submit a
full-length article, the commenters
for the on-line symposium were asked
to provide a lightly-annotated
essays. The full collection of
commentary is here,
as a PDF. (HTML versions of
individual comments are
here.)
Essays by Paul Ohm, Viva Moffett,
and Wendy Seltzer suggest that
mandatory ISP collection and civil
liability might cause many problems
than they would solve. In
response, Citron acknowledges the
force of these arguments.
Accordingly, she suggests that the
best remedies would be to amend
federal civil rights rights statutes
so that they fully cover the abuses
she has described. She also suggests
that some version of Notice &
Takedown might be appropriate,
although, as she detailed in her
Boston University article, this has
problems of its own.
Comments welcome, of course, but
before commenting, please read at
least one of the essays, or Citron’s
original article.
Categories:
Blogosphere,
Computer Crime Law,
Cyberspace Law,
Uncategorized
David Kopel • March 18, 2010 8:49 pm
This week, the
National Journal poll of political bloggers moves to a
new spot on the NJ website, “The Hotline Blogometer.”
Besides the weekly poll, the Blogometer contains a daily
report on what leading liberal and conservative political
bloggers are writing about the controversies of the moment.
In this week’s poll, bloggers were asked “On a scale of 0 to
10, what’s the likelihood that Congress will pass health
care reform?” Based on the information that was available in
the earlier part of this week, the Left answered 7.8, while
the Right said 5.6. Which is not terribly far apart. I
voted for 5, and wrote “In May 1994, President Clinton used
the full force of his office to convince House Democrats to
drive their majority off a cliff, by enacting a ban on
so-called ‘assault weapons’ (ordinary firearms with
cosmetically incorrect features). President Obama and House
leadership seem determined to repeat a similar mistake,
except on a much greater scale.”
Question 2 asked the Left “Is Tim Kaine an asset or a
liability as DNC chairman?” The Right was asked about
Michael Steele and the RNC. On both sides, only 31% voted
for “asset.” The only writer who had anything good to say
about Michael Steele was me: “Probably some of each. Still
having trouble understanding that his job is to help the
team, not to be the star.”
Finally, the bloggers were asked if Obama would be a
one-term President. Thirty-one percent on the Left, and 71
percent on the Right thought so. Of course it’s far too
early to predict with any confidence, but perhaps it would
be accurate to say that his current chances for re-election
are in the 30–70% range. He’s far from doomed, but not
looking particularly solid right now either. I guessed the
one-term would be the more likely result: “He will have
plenty of opportunities in 2011–2012 to change his current
self-destructive course. But it seems more likely that he
will double down on his failures and his policies, which
alienate the majority of the American people.”
Can the House vote to adopt a rule which “deems” that a
particular bill has been passed, even if that particular
bill has not been passed? If so, are there any limits to
the adoption of House rules which eliminate voting on
bills? For example, could the House at the start of a
session adopt a rule which states that there will be no
voting by individual members, and that the House during
the next two years will “deem” to have been passed
whatever the Speaker of the House deems to have been
passed? Is the question justiciable? I don’t have a
fully-formed opinion on these topics, and would welcome
well-informed comments. Please stick to this issue, not
to the merits of the legislation. The most relevant
constitutional text would seem to be the following:
Article I, sect. 1: All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.
Article I, sect. 5: Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings, . . .
Article I, sect. 7: Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States; If he approve he
shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large
on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If
after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
together with the Objections, to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall
become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of
both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays,
and the Names of the Persons voting for and against
the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each
House respectively. If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,
the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be
a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the
President of the United States; and before the Same
shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or
being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in
the Case of a Bill
Also seemingly relevant would be INS v. Chada
(1983), which rejected the position that a section 7
cases present a non-justiciable political question. The
practice at issue in Chada, the one-house veto, was far
more established by practice and by statute than is the
Slaughter Solution of “deeming” an unenacted bill to
have been enacted.
Tags:
Slaughter Solution
This week’s
National Journal poll of political bloggers asked
left-leaning political bloggers “If Congress enacts
something close to President Obama’s latest health care
reform plan, how would that affect the Democratic Party
in the midterm elections?” The right-leaning bloggers
were asked the same question about the effect on
Republicans. On the Left, 40% said that enactment would
help Democrats a lot, and 27% said it would help a
little. On the Right, 77% said it would help Republicans
a lot, and 18% thought it would help a little. I thought
it would help Republicans a lot, and wrote, “This is yet
another example in which the best thing that Democrats
can do to harm the Republicans in the next election is
also the best thing that they can do for the country:
namely, defeat Obamacare.” The second question asked:
“Would the Obama administration be better off if these
individuals [David Axelrod and Rahm Emmanuel] had more
influence, or less influence?” On the Left, 64% favored
more influence for Axelrod, and 100% wanted less
influence for Emmanuel. On the Right, 93% wanted less
influence for Axelrod, and 50% wanted more influence for
Emmanuel. I wrote: “Rahm is politically brilliant, and
has a sense of the possible. Imagine how much stronger
Obama might be right now if he had followed Rahm’s
advice to pass a variety of discrete fixes for health
care rather than investing his entire presidency in a
huge omnibus bill.” In contrast, “Axelrod’s recent
interview in the N.Y. Times indicates that he is among
the Obama devotees who have wrongly convinced themselves
that the only problem with Obamacare is messaging,
rather than substance.
Tags:
David Alexrod,
National Journal,
Rahm Emmanuel
Taliban propagandist
Adam Gadahn (a/k/a Adam Pearlman and “Azzam the
American”) has been captured in Pakistan. In 2006, he
was indicted for treason in the federal district court
for the Central District of California. Both during and
after World War II, federal courts were successfully
used for treason trials for American citizens who had
served as enemy propagandists or committed other acts of
treason. If you would like some analysis of the
precedents, as specifically applied to the Gadahn case,
see Kristen Eichensehr,
Treason’s
Return, 116 Yale
Law Journal Pocket Part (no. 229, 2007) (arguing that
Gadahn should be prosecuted for “levying war” but not
for “giving aid and comfort to the enemy,” because of
free speech concerns); Douglas A. Kash, The United
States v. Adam Gadahn: A Case for Treason, 37 Capital
University Law Review 1 (2008) (good summary of the WWII
cases). As Kash concludes: “By bringing Adam Gadahn to a
U.S. court of law to face criminal charges, while
strictly preserving and affording him all rights
reserved for all defendants, this nation can yet again
show the world that despite the attacks on that fateful
day, the pillars of justice upon which this Republic
stands have not crumbled.”
Update: It
now appears that the man captured was Taliban
commander Abu Yahya, not Adam/Azzam Gadahn/Pearlman. So
consider this post a head start for the discussion when
Gadahn is brought to justice. Unless a drone takes care
of the job first.
Tags:
Adam
Gadahn
The following exchange took
place during James Feldman’s oral argument today, on behalf
of the Chicago government, in McDonald v. Chicago:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:
Would you be happy if we incorporated it and said,
reasonable regulation is part of the incorporation? And
how do we do that?
MR. FELDMAN: Well,
there is the reasonable regulation standard, there is an
article by Professor Winkler that we cite in our brief
that goes very extensively through the ways that State
courts have dealt with their own rights to keep and bear
arms and have adopted, really by overwhelming consensus,
that kind of a reasonable regulation standard, which
generally recognizes
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I
thought that Heller –Heller allowed
for reasonable regulation.
MR. FELDMAN: Excuse me.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I
thought that the Heller decision allowed for
reasonable regulation and it gave a few examples as
Justice Scalia mentioned.
MR. FELDMAN: Right.
Well, it’s just our view would be that what Chicago has
done here, which is permit you to have a — permit you to
have long guns but ban handguns, is the kind of
regulation that throughout our history jurisdictions in
their own — that are most familiar with their own
particular needs and their own particular problems, and
in a position to balance the –the need for self-defense
with the risk to the use of firearms — for violence, for
accidental death and or suicide — that the City of
Chicago has come up with something that is well within
our tradition.
Some clarification here.
Heller never adopted a “reasonable regulation”
standard. Heller allows for machine gun bans under theory
that they are not part of the Second Amendment (that is,
they are not Second Amendment “arms”). Restrictions on gun
carrying in “sensitive places” are not explained
doctrinally, but they are easily comparable to First
Amendment “time, place, and manner” rules. Heller
says that concealed carry may be banned; in the states, the
dominant theory for this restriction was that concealed
carry was not part of the right. Finally, Heller’s
allowance for conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of guns was expressed without being
described as part of some kind of “reasonableness” test.
Feldman was astute to cite
Winkler’s Michigan Law Review article, since that
article argued that state RKBA cases use a “reasonableness”
standard, which Winkler interprets as meaning that almost
any anti-gun laws (including a handgun ban) are alright, as
long as people are allowed to own some type of firearm.
In a forthcoming
Santa Clara Law
Review article, Clayton Cramerand I argue that Winkler
overstates the degree of state judicial deference to
anti-gun laws; we also argue that the weak standard of
review cases are plainly invalid as Second Amendment guides
post–Heller–since the D.C. ban itself would have
been upheld under the standard Winkler describes (and for
which he advocated in a Heller amicus brief along
with Erwin Chemerinsky).
In McDonald, BTW,
Winkler joined the all-star professors team whose amicus
brief advocated for Privileges or Immunities enforcement of
the right to arms.
Regarding today’s oral
argument, I thought that all three attorneys did a good job
arguing on behalf of their respective positions. As it
turned out, only Paul Clement found a majority of the Court
favorable to his core argument, but that’s no strike against
the skills of Gura or Feldman as Supreme Court advocates.
Categories:
Guns,
McDonald v. City of Chicago,
Supreme Court
Before District of Columbia v. Heller, the 1939
decision United States v. Miller was the
Supreme Court’s leading decision on the Second
Amendment. Miller was, to put it mildly,
obliquely written.
As Michael
O’Shea has detailed, the opinion seems mainly
concerned with whether the gun in question was a
militia-type weapon, which would suggest that the
decision is congruent with a well-established line of
state right to arms cases (some of which were cited in
Miller) that all persons had a right to arms,
but that the right only encompasses militia-type arms
(and not, therefore, Bowie knives or other arms
associated with disreputable brawlers). However,
Miller is not clearly written, and over the
subsequent seven decades, there was much dispute about
its meaning. The disputes were almost inevitable, in
that Miller is terse and oblique, and, except
for a history of the early American militia, provides
almost no explication or analysis. At the oral
argument in Heller, Justice Kennedy noted that
Miller “kind of ends abruptly.” In the
Heller decision, the Court observed that Miller was
“virtually unreasoned.” Many scholars have wondered what
Justice McReynolds was trying to do by writing such an
opinion.
The Heller Court pointed out that many lower
courts had “overread” Miller. A
recent post on the Legal History Blog provides some
evidence that legal scholars may also have overread
Miller, for Miller may not have been
written to mean much at all, other than perfunctorily
upholding the National Firearms Act against a facial
challenge. The post highlights Barry Cushman’s 2003
University of Chicago Law Review article
Clerking for
Scrooge. Cushman’s article reviews the 2002 book
The Forgotten Memoir of John Knox: A Year in the Life of
a Supreme Court Clerk in FDR’s Washington.
Since high school, John Knox had been star-struck by
the Supreme Court Justices, attempting to strike up
correspondences with them, sending them birthday
greetings, and so on. After graduating from Harvard Law
School, Knox landed a clerkship with Justice James
McReynolds for the 1936–37 term. McReynolds preferred to
work out of his D.C. apartment, rather than in the
Supreme Court’s then-new building. Knox’s role was
secretarial. Knox later wrote: “I appreciated his
anti-New Deal view and agreed with it, but that was the
only thing I could possibly agree with him on. He was
selfish to an extreme, vindictive, almost sadistically
inclined at times, inconceivably narrow, temperamental,
and heaven knows what. All of his employees lived in a
reign of terror and were crushed under foot without any
hesitation on his part.”
More relevantly for Miller, McReynolds
“found great difficulty in expressing himself in writing
and, sadly enough, was genuinely lazy.” In the September
of the clerkship, Knox had dinner at the home of Mr. and
Mrs. Edward Everett Gann. The Ganns were well-connected
in Washington; Mrs. Dolly Gann was the sister of Herbert
Hoover’s Vice-President, Charles Curtis (1929–33). Mr.
Gann was a friend of McReynolds, and accidentally caught
McReynolds in a tryst with a woman. Knox recalled Gann’s
words: “I concluded finally that he is not really
interested in the work of the Court any more. He’s old,
evidently bored with life and would probably retire now
if he could do so without letting other conservatives on
the Court ‘down.’”
While McReynolds was remarkably even-tempered when
President Roosevelt announced his Court-packing plan
in 1937,
McReynolds appears to have been equally if not
more greatly irritated by the amount of work he had
to do in the spring of 1937. One of McReynolds’s
defining characteristics, on Knox’s account, was
sloth. . . . Nor was Knox impressed with the amount
of time McReynolds put into the preparation of those
opinions he actually did write. The first opinion of
the term went through only two drafts, and
McReynolds spent only about three and one-half hours
working on it, including the hour he had spent
studying the briefs of the case before he had begun
his dictation. He devoted only slightly more time to
his second opinion. Laboring over opinions in a
“scholarly” manner was apparently not Mac’s style.
McReynolds was upset when he was assigned the dissent
in an important labor law case (Anniston
Manufacturing Co v Davis), which he knew would have
to be long. His dawdling delayed the release of the
opinion, eventually leading the other dissenters to come
to his apartment to try to help him get the opinion
done. McReynolds finally decided “he was going to employ
the ‘paste and shears’ method, quoting verbatim from
lower court opinions excerpted in the briefs rather than
composing his own prose.”
Now United States v. Miller becomes easier
to understand. All eight Justices (Douglas, then new to
the Court, did not participate) have voted in conference
to uphold the statute. The lower court opinion is a mere
conclusory assertion. Miller’s attorney did not even
brief or argue the case, but instead told the Court to
rely on the Department of Justice brief. (We
now know
that the district court judge, the local U.S. Attorney,
and, perhaps, the defense attorney, were colluding in
order to bring the weakest possible case to the Supreme
Court, in order to affirm the National Firearms Act.)
So imagine you’re Chief Justice Hughes. Given that
you have to assign McReynolds a majority opinion from
time to time, Miller is the perfect case. The
Court is unanimous, meaning that McReynolds will not be
burdened with responding to dissenting arguments.
Indeed, since the case is uncontested, writing the
majority opinion would be especially easy. McReynold’s
product in Miller was consistent with his lazy
and slapdash approach. Perhaps the other Justices, while
recognizing that there was room for improvement in the
opinion, decided not to press McReynolds for changes,
lest McReynolds fail to get around to making any
revisions, and thereby further delay the progress of the
Court’s business.
All of the opinion-writing Justices in District
of Columbia v. Heller took their work much more
seriously than McReynolds apparently took his work in
Miller, and so both the majority opinion and
the two dissents directly and carefully addressed many
of the important Second Amendment questions which
McReynolds had conspicuously ignored.
Categories:
Anti-Semitism,
Guns,
Registration,
Supreme Court
Boalt Hall Associate Dean Goodwin H. Liu has been
nominated to serve on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Some readers and Senators may be interested in his
viewpoint on Second Amendment and other constitutional
issues related to firearms policy. So here’s an excerpt
from his article Separation Anxiety: Congress, The
Courts, And The Constitution, 91
Georgetown Law Journal 439 (Jan. 2003). Liu’s co-author
on the article is Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton. The
article is based on a 2002 speech that Senator Clinton
presented at Georgetown, sponsored by the American
Constitution Society. Senator Clinton and Professor Liu
criticize recent Supreme Court decisions declaring two
federal gun control laws unconstitutional:
[W]hat we have
seen in recent years gives me pause. . . . Those
changes have come directly from the courts in a
series of rulings that have effectively worked to
exclude the body politic from the ongoing search for
constitutional meaning.
. . .No fewer
than seven times in the last seven Terms, the
Supreme Court has invalidated part of a federal
statute on the ground that Congress exceeded its
power to regulate commerce, its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, or its inherent power within
our system of “dual sovereignty.” Those statutes
include the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the
Violence Against Women Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
. . .
United States v.
Lopez, the 1995 case that said that Congress cannot
make it a crime to knowingly possess a gun within
1,000 feet of a school, was the first time in sixty
years that the Court had imposed a substantive limit
on what Congress can and cannot do under the
Commerce Clause. Echoing a prophecy stated in an
earlier era, the Court warned that if the law were
upheld, then “there never will be a distinction
between what is truly national and what is
truly local.”
[Paragraph on
United States v. Morrison, Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, and Alabama v. Garrett.]
Beyond the
damage that these cases do to civil rights, and the
fact that they upset settled understandings of
congressional power, what is troubling about them is
that they do not occur at a time in our Nation’s
history when there is a significant public clamor
for a different constitutional vision. To be sure,
there has been a general tendency in recent decades
in favor of a smaller role for national government,
although many have rethought such notions in the
wake of September 11th. But more importantly, the
recently invalidated statutes themselves provide
compelling evidence that the American people are not
the true wizards behind the Court’s velvet curtain.
The Gun-Free
School Zones Act passed the House by a vote of 313
to 1; it cleared the Senate by unanimous
consent. . . .
But even more
astounding than the Court’s willingness to override
commonsense legislation with such broad support is
its eagerness to do so in terms which are
deliberately designed to exclude Congress—and by
extension, the American people—from playing a part
in defining what the Constitution requires and what
it permits. The recent cases do not pretend to be
opening arguments in a longer debate. Instead, they
are self-conscious pronouncements asserting the
Court’s authority to be the sole and final arbiter
of constitutional meaning. More and more, it seems,
Congress and the American people, by extension, are
regarded by the Court as mere targets of judicial
discipline, unable to live and govern themselves
within “judicially enforceable outer limits.”
The Court may
have the final say on constitutional interpretation,
but I do not see any reason why it should have the
only say. . . .
When the
Constitution says that Congress shall have power “to
regulate commerce ... among the several States,”
does that not suggest that Congress has some role in
determining what counts as interstate commerce? . .
. The Court’s recent opinions seem to say no. In the
eyes of the Court, whatever Congress may think the
Constitution permits or requires does not seem to
count for much.
The net result
is that Congress is now left to navigate a doctrinal
minefield of magic words. . . . The next time I
consider school safety legislation, should I wonder
whether school safety is “truly national” or “truly
local”? And as I work on hate crimes legislation or
a bill to ban workplace discrimination based on
sexual orientation, how can I be sure it is a
“congruen[t] and proportional” response to a
constitutional wrong before I hear the answer from
the other side of Constitution Avenue?
These questions
begin to give you some idea of the anxiety I feel
about the Court’s unilateral effort to redefine the
separation of powers in our national government.
Beyond raising new questions about the
constitutionality of substantive legislation, the
Court has sought to minimize the significance of
Congress’s views on those very constitutional
questions.
. . .
Let me conclude
tonight with a call to action on two fronts. First,
what we see happening in the courts today
underscores how important it is that we in the
Senate diligently exercise our constitutional duty
to scrutinize judicial nominees—including nominees
to the lower federal courts. Let us not forget that
cases like Lopez and Morrison affirmed the decisions
of lower-court judges who laid the groundwork for
the dramatic shifts in doctrine we see today. [FN72]
I applaud the efforts of my colleagues on the Senate
Judiciary Committee who have done the hard work of
ensuring that our federal judges are fair,
disciplined, and faithful to the law. The
nominations process is an important form of national
dialogue on the relationship between Congress and
the courts. And for each nominee, it is crucial that
the Senate discharge its duty to “advise” before it
“consents.”
Footnote 72 includes the following:
The Supreme Court has seen fit to rein in some of
the most activist lower-court decisions. . . . But
additional cases continue to test the limits. See,
e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227–29
(5th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with district court that
Second Amendment confers an individual right to bear
arms, notwithstanding contrary indications in United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
As
detailed in an investigation by the Independence
Institute’s Todd Shepherd. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
lost at least 985 computers in the 2008 fiscal year. ICE
also lost 13 automobiles, while CBP lost 235 night
vision scopes. Categories:
Uncategorized
A few weeks ago, I linked to a picture of civil
rights activist John Salter being attacked by a mob
during a lunch counter sit-in during the 1960s. I
also linked to a newspaper op-ed in which Salter
explained how he and other civil rights workers used
firearms for protection from Klansmen and other
terrorists—when Klansmen knew that a homicide would
not be witnessed by the news media. Since that blog
post seemed to draw great interest from the readers,
I thought that some persons might be interested in
the longer version of Salter’s history of the role
of armed self-defense in the Civil Rights Movement.
The longer version is John R. Salter, Jr., “Social
Justice Community Organizing and the Necessity for
Protective Firearms,” which is chapter 2 of The Gun
Culture and Its Enemies 19–23 (William R. Tonso,
editor, Merril Press, 1990.) (Merril Press is the
press for the Second Amendment Foundation.) The
chapter was first published as an article by Salter
in Against the Current, July/August 1988. The
magazine describes itself as an “analytical journal
for the broad revolutionary left.”
http://www.solidarity-us.org/current/publications
Unfortunately, neither version is available on-line,
so I will provide a summary.
In the mid-1960s, Salter was a full-time community
organizer for the Southern Conference Educational
Fund, in the very poor and highly segregated North
Carolina black belt. Klan activity was heavy, and
“Local law enforcement was almost completely
dominated by the United Klans of America.” Klan dues
were collected at the police station in Enfield.
Having received many death threats, Salter carried a
Smith & Wesson .38 special in his attaché case. One
night, on a long stretch of isolated country road, a
Klan vehicle tried to force Salter’s car into a
high-speed chase, by tailing him nearly
bumper-to-bumper. “But I continued to drive
sedately, mile after mile…with my revolver in my
hand.” Salter and the other community organizers had
put out word on the grapevine that they were all
armed, and he surmises that this was the reason that
the Klansmen did not try to shoot him that night.
Soon after, “a local civil rights stalwart, Mrs.
Alice Evans, of Enfield, opened fire with her
double-barreled 12 gauge, sprinkling several KKKers
with birdshot as they endeavored to burn a cross in
her driveway one night and, simultaneously ,
approaching her homes with buckets of gasoline.” The
Klansmen fled and went to the hospital. Mrs. Evans
donated the cross to the Smithsonian Museum.
Salter then recounts the story of the armed students
and teachers who protected Tougaloo College, near
Jackson, Mississippi, when Salter taught there in
1961–63. That story is recounted in the op-ed to
which I linked in the previous post.
In late 1964, the Klan was scheduling a state-wide
rally in Halifax County, near a black residential
area. Rally posters were displayed at “most law
enforcement offices in the county.” Salter and his
fellow organizers asked the office of Governor Terry
Sanford to provide state police protection for the
black residents. Sanford’s office ignored the
requests, until Salter went to Sanford’s office, got
a meeting with the chief of staff, and told him that
if the state police did not provide protection, “our
people, armed to the hilt, would have no hesitation
about utilizing armed self-defense in the event of
Klan violence. Visibly shaken, the aide left me and
conferred with Sanford. He returned quickly to
promise the state police.”
Klan rallies continued for several more months in
the area, and so did state police protection.
In 1965 in North Carolina, the FBI and Justice
Department told Salter than an informant inside a
United Klans klavern had reported on a plan to bomb
Salter’s home in Raleigh.The FBI agent told Salter
and his wife that the federal government could not
do anything about it. Of course, “Local law
enforcement was not reliable. Fortunately, we lived
in the middle of a heavily armed Black community,”
and Salter’s neighbors were “very protective.” They
and Salter put out the word that the community was
armed for defense. Thus, “We were not surprised when
the bombing effort never materialized.”
In the summer of 1970, Salter was Southside Director
for the Chicago Commons Association. As such, he was
a community organizer for mostly “Black, Puerto
Rican, and Chicano” people. On the South/Southwest
side of Chicago, the racism was “often more violent
and sanguinary than the Deep South of the previous
decade. The Richard Daley machine was openly
antagonistic to us . . .” In some but not all
districts, the police were in league with the
racists.
Death threats were frequent. When they were phoned
in, Salter told the callers, “that I had a ticket
for them, a pass to permanent eternity via my Marlin
.444.” One day while Salter was at work and his wife
was at home, some men with knives came to the home,
but a vigilant neighbor with a revolver frightened
them away.
In Chicago in 1973, Salter’s community network of
nearly 300 block clubs “set up public citizen
‘watch-dog’ patrols.” These were generally unarmed,
with “primary backup from a network of armed
citizenry in the neighborhoods,” with whom the
patrols stayed in contact via Citizens Band radio
and telephone. “The effects of this well known
campaign in deterring while racial violence were
consistently substantial.” Soon, and as a result,
politicians “forced in effect increasingly
responsible and egalitarian law enforcement
practices. But the patrols and vigilance of armed
neighborhoods continued.”
In conclusion, Salter writers that firearms are not
an absolute guarantee of safety for community
organizers; Medger W. Evers (NAACP Field Secretary
for Mississippi) was murdered in June 1963, but
being armed had helped him to live for nine years
longer than most people expected he would when he
took the job in 1954.
In sum, “I am stating categorically that the number
of fatalities” was “much smaller” because
“organizers and their grassroots groups” were
“sensibly armed for self-defense.”
A few weeks ago, I linked to a picture of civil
rights activist John Salter being attacked by a mob
during a lunch counter sit-in during the 1960s. I also
linked to a newspaper op-ed in which Salter explained
how he and other civil rights workers used firearms for
protection from Klansmen and other terrorists—when
Klansmen knew that a homicide would not be witnessed by
the news media. Since
that blog post drew great interest from the readers,
I thought that some persons might be interested in the
longer version of Salter’s history of the role of armed
self-defense in the Civil Rights Movement.
The longer version is John R. Salter, Jr., “Social
Justice Community Organizing and the Necessity for
Protective Firearms,” which is chapter 2 of The Gun
Culture and Its Enemies , pp. 19–23 (William R.
Tonso, editor, Merril Press, 1990.) (Merril Press is
the press for the Second Amendment Foundation.) The
chapter was first published as an article by Salter in
Against the Current, July/August 1988. The
magazine
describes itself as an “analytical journal for the
broad revolutionary left.” Since neither version is
available on-line, I will provide a summary.
In the mid-1960s, Salter was a full-time community
organizer for the Southern Conference Educational Fund,
in the very poor and highly segregated North Carolina
black belt. Klan activity was heavy, and “Local law
enforcement was almost completely dominated by the
United Klans of America.” Klan dues were collected at
the police station in Enfield.
Having received many death threats, Salter carried a
Smith & Wesson .38 special in his attaché case. One
night, on a long stretch of isolated country road, a
Klan vehicle tried to force Salter’s car into a
high-speed chase, by tailing him nearly
bumper-to-bumper. “But I continued to drive sedately,
mile after mile…with my revolver in my hand.” Salter and
the other community organizers had put out word on the
grapevine that they were all armed, and he surmises that
this was the reason that the Klansmen did not try to
shoot him that night.
Soon after, “a local civil rights stalwart, Mrs.
Alice Evans, of Enfield, opened fire with her
double-barreled 12 gauge, sprinkling several KKKers with
birdshot as they endeavored to burn a cross in her
driveway one night and, simultaneously, approaching her
home with buckets of gasoline.” The Klansmen fled and
went to the hospital. Mrs. Evans donated the cross to
the Smithsonian Museum.
Salter then recounts the story of the armed students
and teachers who protected Tougaloo College, near
Jackson, Mississippi, when Salter taught there in
1961–63. That story is recounted in the op-ed to which I
linked in the previous post.
In late 1964, the Klan was scheduling a state-wide
rally in Halifax County, N.C., near a black residential
area. Rally posters were displayed at “most law
enforcement offices in the county.” Salter and his
fellow organizers asked the office of Governor Terry
Sanford to provide state police protection for the black
residents. Sanford’s office ignored the requests, until
Salter went to Sanford’s office, got a meeting with the
chief of staff, and told him that if the state police
did not provide protection, “our people, armed to the
hilt, would have no hesitation about utilizing armed
self-defense in the event of Klan violence. Visibly
shaken, the aide left me and conferred with Sanford. He
returned quickly to promise the state police.”
Klan rallies continued for several more months in the
area, and so did state police protection.
In 1965 in North Carolina, the FBI and Justice
Department told Salter than an informant inside a United
Klans klavern had reported on a plan to bomb Salter’s
home in Raleigh.The FBI agent told Salter and his wife
that the federal government could not do anything about
it. Of course, “Local law enforcement was not reliable.
Fortunately, we lived in the middle of a heavily armed
Black community,” and Salter’s neighbors were “very
protective.” They and Salter put out the word that the
community was armed for defense. Thus, “We were not
surprised when the bombing effort never materialized.”
In the summer of 1970, Salter was Southside Director
for the Chicago Commons Association. As such, he was a
community organizer for mostly “Black, Puerto Rican, and
Chicano” people. On the South/Southwest side of Chicago,
the racism was “often more violent and sanguinary than
the Deep South of the previous decade. The Richard Daley
machine was openly antagonistic to us . . .” In some but
not all districts, the police were in league with the
racists.
Death threats were frequent. When they were phoned
in, Salter told the callers, “that I had a ticket for
them, a pass to permanent eternity via my Marlin .444.”
One day while Salter was at work and his wife was at
home, some men with knives came to the home, but a
vigilant neighbor with a revolver frightened them away.
In Chicago in 1973, Salter’s community network of
nearly 300 block clubs “set up public citizen
‘watch-dog’ patrols.” These were generally unarmed, with
“primary backup from a network of armed citizenry in the
neighborhoods,” with whom the patrols stayed in contact
via Citizens Band radio and telephone. “The effects of
this well known campaign in deterring while racial
violence were consistently substantial.” Soon, and as a
result, politicians instituted “increasingly responsible
and egalitarian law enforcement practices. But the
patrols and vigilance of armed neighborhoods continued.”
Salter write that firearms are not an absolute
guarantee of safety for community organizers; Medger
W. Evers (NAACP Field Secretary for Mississippi) was
murdered in June 1963, but being armed did help him to
live for nine years longer than most people expected he
would when he took the job in 1954.
In sum, “I am stating categorically that the number
of fatalities” was “much smaller” because “organizers
and their grassroots groups” were “sensibly armed for
self-defense.”
Categories:
Civil Rights,
Guns,
McDonald v. City of Chicago
An excellent
student note by Shannon K. Calt, forthcoming in the
Lewis & Clark Law Review, explains the case of
A. B. & C. v. Ireland, currently pending before
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights.
The case challenges the Eighth Amendment of the Irish
Constitution, which prohibits abortion under almost all
circumstances. The Amendment was added by the Irish
people in order to prevent the judicial creation of a
right to abortion, as in Roe v. Wade. As the
note explains, subsequent case law had held that the
Irish government cannot forbid Irish women from
traveling to England to obtain legal abortions there.
The note predicts two possible outcomes for the A.,
B. & C. case: 1. the ECHR will require Ireland to
provide better post-abortion medical care to Irish women
who need medical services after obtaining an English
abortion. OR 2. The ECHR will create a right to
abortion. The latter decision, suggests the note, would
be predicated on the ECHR characterizing Ireland’s
interest in its constitutional amendment as merely
involving “morals,” rather than the protection of
innocent life. A decision of the Grand Chamber (17
members, en banc) is binding on all nations which have
signed the European Convention on Human Rights. Tags:
abortion,
European Court of Human Rights,
Ireland
That’s that title of a
forthcoming
article in a Santa Clara Law Review
symposium, by Clayton Cramer and me. We
examine, in detail, scores of important cases, from
Bliss v. Commonwealth in 1822 up to the present. We
explain which cases can provide useful guidance to
modern courts which must interpret the Second Amendment
(and which cases use an approach is plainly inapplicable
to Second Amendment analysis, post– Heller).
Our Article also addresses Adam Winkler’s influential
and well-written 2007 Michigan Law Review
article, which surveyed post-WW II state cases. Our
article studies a broader range of cases, and gets into
more depth on those csases, so it’s 93 pages long. It
was even longer until the editors changed the typeface
from Century Schoolbook to Times New Roman. Here’s the
abstract:
Cases on the right to arms in state constitutions
can provide useful guidance for courts addressing
Second Amendment issues. Although some people have
claimed that state courts always use a highly
deferential version of “reasonableness,” this
article shows that many courts have employed
rigorous standards, including the tools of strict
scrutiny, such as overbreadth, narrow tailoring, and
less restrictive means. Courts have also used
categoricalism (deciding whether something is inside
or outside the right) and narrow construction (to
prevent criminal laws from conflicting with the
right to arms). Even when formally applying
“reasonableness,” many courts have used
reasonableness as a serious, non-deferential
standard of review. District of Columbia v. Heller
teaches that supine standards of review, such as
deferring to the mere invocation of “police power,”
are inappropriate in Second Amendment
interpretation. This article surveys important state
cases from the Early Republic to the present, and
explains how they may be applied to the Second
Amendment.
The article is founded on the tremendous research on
state cases which Clayton conducted for his 1994 book
For the Defense of Themselves and the State.
That book was cited by the Washington Supreme Court in
its new decision
State v. Sieyes.
Categories:
Guns,
Militia
Five new podcasts from the Independence Institute’s
iVoices.org: 1. The
University of Montana’s Rob Natelson on the
Executive Vesting Clause. Natelson argues that the
first clause of Article II grants the President
no additional powers–contrary to the theory that the
clause gives the President almost all the powers
formerly possessed by English Kings. 36 minutes.
2.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause and what it
means for the Second Amendment. The Cato Institute’s
Ilya Shapiro discusses his new law review article. 29
minutes. (The
final version of the Shapiro-Blackman article,
“Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed: Privileges or Immunities,
The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States,” was just
uploaded to SSRN today.)
3.
What Miller Meant. Oklahoma City University’s
Michael O’Shea explains the history and multiple
meanings of United States v. Miller. 65 minutes.
4.
The International Hunter Education Association. IHEA’s
Wayne East describes the IHEA’s good works in teaching
safety and responsibility. And how you can take most of
a hunter safety course on-line. 26 minutes.
5. Weld County, Colorado,
Sheriff John Cooke provides law enforcement
perspective on three bills in the Colorado legislature:
removing the Governor’s power to prohibit gun sales,
transfers, or transportation during an emergency; a
declaration that the federal government cannot apply
federal gun control laws to guns manufactured in
Colorado and which do not leave the state of Colorado
(background checks on sales would still be required
pursuant to Colorado law); and a bill to state that
business owners on their own property have the same
self-defense rights as do persons in their own homes.
All three bills were supported by the County Sheriffs of
Colorado. The first two bills were killed on party-line
votes in a state Senate committee; the last bill is
awaiting a committee vote in the House.
The first four are interviews I conducted last week.
The last interview is conducted by Independence
Institute’s Amy Oliver.
Categories:
Constitutional History,
Guns,
Legal Scholarship
Microsoft Outlook has worked well for me on
some computers, but has always been troublesome on one of
them. I tried upgrading to the Outlook 2010 beta, and
that’s been a horror story. Accordingly, I humbly solicit
recommendations about an e-mail software program for
accessing several POP accounts. Thanks.
Categories:
Uncategorized
So suggests John Avalon, in a Daily Beast column “ The
Secret History of the Birthers.” He traces
birtherism to a Texas woman named Linda Starr, who was a
Hillary Clinton delegate to the 2008 Texas state
Democratic Convention. Avalon writes that Starr “was
also cited as a key source for CBS’ discredited election
year investigation into George W. Bush’s National Guard
records that led to Dan Rather’s replacement after 24
years as the evening news anchor.” Avalon links to the
Thornburgh/Boccardi report, which was conducted at
the request of CBS News to examine CBS’s conduct in
producing the infamous 60 Minutes story about
Bush supposedly evading National Guard service and then
having the records scrubbed. As the report details,
Starr made the claim about Bush in an article on her
website, three days before the 2000 presidential
election. She also played a key role in serving as an
intermediary for CBS to obtain the document which
purported to be National Guard memo regarding the
removal of NG records about Bush. The Thornburgh/Boccardi
report does not claim that Ms. Starr knew that the
document was a clumsy fabrication. At the very least,
however, the fiasco of the Bush National Guard story
shows that Ms. Starr did not provide her Internet
readers, or CBS, with a story which could withstand
factual scrutiny. Accordingly, if Avalon’s reporting is
correct, he has provided yet another reason for people
to disbelieve the (already-implausible) assertion that
President Obama was not born in the United States. In
contrast to the way the mainstream media initially
handled the 2004 Bush National Guard story, the
mainstream media did a better job in 2008 by not
embracing a story about a presidential candidate which
could not be supported by solid, verifiable facts.
Categories:
Bush,
Media,
Obama,
Politics
Over at The Faculty Lounge, there are
some pictures of sit-ins from the early 1960s.
Regarding a 1963 sit-in in Jackson, Mississippi, TFL
writes: “By one account, members of the all-White
Jackson police force stood guard outside, while several
FBI agents (the guys in back wearing shades) ‘observed’
from inside. That White guy at the counter, that’s
Tougaloo professor and community activist Hunter Gray
(John R. Salter) who helped organize the Jackson
sit-ins. And that’s blood on his shirt. All of the
protesters had been covered in slop, and some were
beaten with brass knuckles and broken bottles.” The
non-violent Civil Rights protesters allowed themselves
to be beaten in public while the media watched; the
images helped win sympathy for the Civil Rights Movement
in the North, and proved to be crucial in developing the
political will for the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
In a limited sense, the media’s presence provided
some protection for the protesters; there was never a
case in which a civil rights protester was murdered in
front of media cameras. At night, when everyone had gone
home, things were very different. As Salter later
explained:
I was beaten and arrested many times and
hospitalized twice. This happened to many, many
people in the movement. No one knows what kind of
massive racist retaliation would have been directed
against grassroots black people had the black
community not had a healthy measure of firearms
within it.
When the campus of Tougaloo College was fired on
by KKK-type racial night-riders, my home was shot up
and a bullet missed my infant daughter by inches. We
received no help from the Justice Department and we
guarded our campus — faculty and students together —
on that and subsequent occasions. We let this be
known. The racist attacks slackened considerably.
Night-riders are cowardly people — in any time and
place — and they take advantage of fear and
weakness.
Later, I worked for years in the Deep South as a
full-time civil rights organizer. Like a martyred
friend of mine, NAACP staffer Medgar W. Evers, I,
too, was on many Klan death lists and I, too,
traveled armed: a .38 special Smith and Wesson
revolver and a 44/40 Winchester carbine.
The knowledge that I had these weapons and was
willing to use them kept enemies at bay. Years
later, in a changed Mississippi, this was confirmed
by a former prominent leader of the White Knights of
the KKK when we had an interesting dinner together
at Jackson.
In the 1970s, I was Southside director of the
large, privately-funded Chicago Commons Association.
Our primary focus involved assisting minority people
in developing sensible community organizations —
vis-a-vis schools, city services, anti-crime.
We were opposed by white racist organizations
(e.g., Nazi Party) and various youth gangs of many
sorts. My staff and I received countless death
threats, there were arson attacks on our offices,
and, on one occasion, men with weapons came to my
home and told my wife and children that they
intended to kill me. (I happened to be at work.)
Again, I was glad I had many firearms and, again,
we guarded our home and let this be known. We
responded to hate calls on the telephone by telling
the callers we were quite prepared for them.
For Salter, the right to own a handgun was apparently
a crucial part of his ability to exercise his right to
defend himself and his family, which was a sine qua
non of his ability to stay alive in order to
exercise his First Amendment rights to advocate for
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet in modern Chicago, decent law-abiding citizens
are forbidden to own handguns. As I detailed in my
amicus brief
in McDonald v. Chicago (pages 39–45), many
people find that a handgun is best choice for family
defense, especially in urban areas such as Chicago. As
the history of the Civil Rights Movement demonstrates,
the denial of the constitutional right to own a handgun
could endanger other constitutional rights, particularly
the rights of community organizers.
Categories:
Civil Rights,
Guns
Last week’s
National Journal poll of political bloggers asked
for an estimate of House Democratic losses in the 2010
election. While the answers are reported in clusters of
10, the median estimate for the Left appears to about 20
seats. The median on the Right was in the mid-30s. I
estimated 38, adding “Could be less if the congressional
leadership and Obama correct their course, but they do
not seem inclined to do so.” Question 2 asked the Left
if Democrats would benefit politically from another
televised Q&A session by President Obama with House
Republicans. Seventy-eight percent of the Left expected
Democrats to benefit. Right-leaning bloggers were asked
if Republicans would benefit, and 57 percent said yes. I
was in the majority: “All Americans would benefit. All
Republicans are Americans. Ergo, Republicans would
benefit. The metric of success should not be partisan
benefit, but rather national benefit.”
Categories:
Congress,
Politics
One of the foremost attorneys in China, Gao Zisheng
believed in the rule of law, and began to try to use the
law to protect human rights. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.)
describes what happened next:
He wrote an open letter to the United States
Congress asking us to pay some attention to the lack
of human rights that existed in China. For writing
an open letter to members of the United States
Congress in 2007, Gao Zhisheng, one of the most
distinguished human rights — noted and distinguished
human rights lawyers in China, was imprisoned for 58
days and brutally tortured.
Now, in 2009, he was detained 80 days ago by ten
members of the secret police in China and has not
been heard from since.
Let me tell you what his transpired. Mr. Gao
Zhisheng has represented some of the most vulnerable
people in China. They include persecuted Christians,
coal miners and others. He always believed in the
power of law; using the law to battle corruption, to
overturn illegal property seizures, to expose police
abuses, to defend religious freedom. He’s a devout
Christian. He fought to protect those who engage in
peaceful spiritual and religious practice in China.
And in 2005, they took away his license to practice
law, closed his law practice. As I said, in 2007,
they arrested him, threw him in prison and tortured
him. Eventually he was released and brought back
home and placed under police surveillance at home.
The surveillance proved almost harsher than prison.
In fact, a member of the communist police moved into
their living room, prevented his daughter from going
to school; his 16-year-old daughter barred from
attending schools. 24-hour surveillance.
He wrote an open letter to
the United States Congress asking us to pay some
attention to the lack of human rights that existed in
China. For writing an open letter to members of the
United States Congress in 2007, Gao Zhisheng, one of the
most distinguished human rights — noted and
distinguished human rights lawyers in China, was
imprisoned for 58 days and brutally tortured.
. . . Mr. Gao Zhisheng has
represented some of the most vulnerable people in China.
They include persecuted Christians, coal miners and
others. He always believed in the power of law; using
the law to battle corruption, to overturn illegal
property seizures, to expose police abuses, to defend
religious freedom. He’s a devout Christian. He fought to
protect those who engage in peaceful spiritual and
religious practice in China.
And in 2005, they took
away his license to practice law, closed his law
practice. As I said, in 2007, they arrested him, threw
him in prison and tortured him. Eventually he was
released and brought back home and placed under police
surveillance at home. The surveillance proved almost
harsher than prison. In fact, a member of the communist
police moved into their living room, prevented his
daughter from going to school; his 16-year-old daughter
barred from attending schools. 24-hour surveillance.
One year ago, on February 4, 2009, Gao Zisheng was
again seized by the Chinese government. No one except
his Chinese captors knew whether he was dead or alive.
Finally, after continuing international pressure from
citizens and free governments, the Chinese apparently
leaked word in January to an Australian newspaper that
he is still alive.
Those readers who know their English legal history
know the stories of the great lawyers during the Tudor
and Stuart reigns, who used the law to challenge the
abuses of the monarchs. Those readers know the debt that
every free American owes to those lawyers, who
sacrificed so much–and sometimes their lives–to
establish the rule of law. During the reigns of the
Tudors and Stuarts, the friends of a courageous lawyer
who had been unlawfully imprisoned could resort to the
Great Writ,
the
writ of habeas corpus, to secure a judicial hearing
on his detention under the law.
There is no writ of habeas corpus in China, nor are
there most of the other civil rights guarantees which
are characteristic of a civilized nation with a free
government. And so Gao Zisheng’s writ of habeas corpus
will not be issued by a Chinese court, but its moral
equivalent can be issued by the free people of the
world: commanding that the body of Gao Zisheng, in the
Chinese government’s custody detained, as it is said,
together with the day and cause of his caption and
detention, be safely brought forth. If you would like to
sign a petition to free Gao Zisheng, or contact your
elected officials to urge them to press for his freedom,
or take other steps,
click here.
Categories:
Habeas
Last week’s
National Journal poll of political bloggers asked
“What’s the most likely outcome this year of President
Obama’s health care reform initiative?” The plurality
choice on the Left, and the majority choice on the
Right, was “Scaled-back legislation will be enacted.” I
agreed: “Remember, even after the defeat of Hillarycare,
many of its sub-elements were later enacted even by
Republican Congresses. While time ran out on Hillarycare
in the fall of 1994, this year the Obamacare supporters
have nearly a year left to get something done.” The
second question asked about the political effects of the
Citizens United decision. Seventy percent of
the Left thought it would help Republicans a lot. Only 6
percent on the Right thought the same, while another 33
percent thought it would help a little. The leading
choice on the Right was “not much impact.” That was my
view, based on empirical experience: “Based on the
experience of about half of the states, which never
restricted the free speech rights of people in
corporations, it’s hard to see much of a partisan impact
from respecting the First Amendment.”
Tags:
National Journal poll political bloggers
“In the urban industrial society of today a general
right to bear efficient arms so as to be enabled to
resist oppression by the government would mean that
gangs could exercise an extra-legal rule which would
defeat the whole Bill of Rights.” Roscoe Pound, The
Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty
91 (1957). Although Pound prided himself on being in
touch with current realities, he was already being be
proven wrong by the facts on the ground. The
possession of efficient arms by civil rights workers
(including Condoleezza Rice’s father, a Methodist
minister) and of groups like the Deacons for Defense was
essential to the success of the Second Reconstruction. A
key reason why the Second Reconstruction succeeded and
the First Reconstruction failed was that the
second time, the defenders of the Constitution had
sufficient arms to resist attacks by the Ku Klux Klan
and other state-supported terrorist organizations.
Arms possession by the civil rights advocates in the
late 1950s and 1960s did not lead to lawless gang rule.
It led to the restoration of the rule of law in the
South, to the long-delayed enforcement of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.
Although Pound was sometimes cited by opponents of
the Standard Model of the Second Amendment, Pound’s
point was not really that the Standard Model is wrong as
a matter of original intent/meaning, but simply that the
Second Amendment is no longer a good idea as a matter of
public policy. Pound’s view that the Second Amendment
could be ignored if modern persons thought it was no
longer a good idea is consistent with his general view
that legislation which once would have been clearly
unconstitutional could be considered constitutional in
modern times, based on perceptions of changed social
needs. See generally Roscoe Pound, “Mechanical
Jurisprudence,” 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605 (1908).
As David Bernstein has
explained, Pound argued on a broad front that judges
should ignore the text and original meaning of the
Constitution, so as not to impede (supposedly)
beneficial expansions of government power to restrict
personal freedom. Pound was no friend of the
Constitution.
Categories:
Civil Rights,
Constitutional History,
Guns
This week’s
National Journal poll of political bloggers asked
“Which of these pieces of legislation, if enacted, would
help the Democrats’ political prospects in the midterm
elections?” Bloggers could choose more than one. The
leading choice for both Left and Right bloggers was “job
creation.” The only other items which got more than 50%
from either group of voters was deficit reduction (from
the Right), and health care and financial industry
reform (from the Left). I thought that most of the
available choices would be helpful for the Democrats, if
done properly: ““Cap-and-trade would be a political
disaster. Taxing banks in general (rather than dealing
with the subset that helped cause the meltdown) would be
of little benefit. Greatly reducing the deficit now (as
opposed to promising to reduce it later) would be
enormously helpful. The financial/health/immigration/job
items could all be helpful, but only if they are done in
a fiscally responsible way, do not reward illegal
aliens, and are moderate enough to pick up some
significant GOP support.” The second question was
“Given the outcome of the Massachusetts Senate race,
what would be best politically for
[Democrats/Republicans] on health care reform?”
Pluralities on the Left (for Democrats) and the Right
(for Republicans) thought that House passage of the
Senate bill would be the best political outcome. My
view: “Politically speaking, the worse the better —
passage of the Senate bill would be great, and passage
of the House bill even better. For the good of the
nation, however, it’s better to start over — and for the
starting points to be allowing the purchase of insurance
across state lines, ending the tax code’s bias for
employer-provided insurance, and moving to a true
insurance system, in which customers pay up front for
routine costs, with insurance in reserve for
extraordinary costs.”
Categories:
Health Care,
Politics
Get out and knock on doors. My father’s
latest column explains why, based on his own
experience as a candidate (with an 11–2 election
record). Six months of door-knocking–every two
years–helped him far outperform his party, and win some
tough elections. The column also examines how the
Colorado state Department of Regulatory Affairs might
regulate medical marijuana dispensaries.
Categories:
Politics
Austin Gun Rights Examiner Howard Nemerov once again
shows why he is one of the best journalists writing on
the gun issue. His
latest column debunks an Internet rumor that the
BATFE forced a Texas gun show to allow sales only by
federally licensed firearms dealers. Categories:
Guns
Cardozo De Novo, the online companion to the Carodozo
Law Review, has a
symposium issue on firearms law and policy, with a
focus on McDonald v. Chicago. Articles include
The Second Amendment in the Living Constitution, by
me; a
critique of the Stevens dissent in Heller,
by David Hardy; and a
proposal by Michael Anthony Lawrence that all
restrictions on liberty be judged according to a
“reasonable time, place, and manner” standard. In the
comments section, feel free to discuss any of the
articles.
Categories:
Fourteenth Amendment,
Guns
From a
segment on the Russian station
for Radio Liberty. (Transcript, plus
audio link.) For those of you who
don’t read Russian, the short
explanation is: The desire of voters
to send a message of their
disapproval of George Bush is
considerably less significant than
it was in 2006. Generally speaking,
American prefer divided government.
Categories:
Politics
This Monday, Jan. 25,
at the University of Colorado at
Boulder. Jonathan Rauch
(National Journal, The Atlantic,
Brookings) vs. Maggie Gallagher
(National Organization for
Marriage). Two outstanding, very
articulate, intellectually rigorous
advocates for their respective
points of view. Categories:
Uncategorized
Reports a
new poll for Politico, conducted entirely on Sunday
night.
Dorothy Rabinowitz and
Ann Coulter have both explained why Coakley’s role
in the Amirault case–involving the persecution and
long-term imprisonment of plainly innocent people,
reveal her to be utterly unfit to serve in any public
office. That Coakley is now
plainly lying about Scott Brown and rape is further
proof of a character that appears to be remarkably
scurrilous. Categories:
Uncategorized
This week’s
National Journal poll of political
bloggers asked for a prediction
about how many House seats the
Democrats would lose in the November
2010 elections. Significantly, not
one of the bloggers predicted a
large enough loss to change control
of the chamber. On the Right, 45%
predicted a loss of 31–40 seats,
while the rest predicted lower. On
the Left, the median was in the
11–20 range. The second question
asked for a grade on President
Obama’s economic performance. The
Left gave him a C-, while the Right
awarded a D-. I voted for F: “Taking
the irresponsible Bush deficits and
making them much, much worse.
Spending vast amounts of the
‘stimulus’ on wasteful pork,
giveaways and political payoffs
rather than infrastructure or other
useful projects. Continuing the Bush
TARP program of transferring wealth
from productive working people to
the bankers who helped cause the
meltdown. And turning the auto
industry into a federal welfare
program.”
Categories:
Politics
Over the past few weeks, there has
been a lot of concern in some
quarters about President Obama’s
Executive Order extending certain
legal immunities to Interpol. These
concerns are misplaced. I am
currently writing a research paper
on Interpol, which will cover the
immunities, and many other issues.
In the meantime, some preliminary
clarifications: Interpol has no
authority to make arrests or seize
property. Interpol is purely an
organization for data exchange and
analysis. Interpol employees in the
United States (or anywhere else)
have no authority to conduct any
activities except as allowed by the
host government. The Obama Executive
Order adds nothing to Interpol’s
non-existent law enforcement
authority.
Interpol’s entire US presence
consists of a five-person office in
New York City for liaison with the
United Nations. Under the Obama
order, the premises and documents of
this NYC office are absolutely
immune from search and seizure.
Pursuant to the International
Organizations Immunities Act, passed
by Congress in at the time the
United Nations was being set up,
seventy other international
organizations in the US have
immunities identical to
those now possessed by Interpol. The
presence of the UN was obviously
going to lead to the establishment
of US offices for many international
organizations, and Congress want to
regularize the procedures and
immunities for such organizations.
Unlike standard international
organizations, Interpol was not
created by a treaty, and its
membership consist of police
agencies, not nations per se.
So one could make the legal argument
that Interpol is not an
international organization. However,
both the United Nations and the
United States have taken the
position that Interpol qualifies as
an international organization.
Interpol requested the full set
of IOIA immunities in 2005. In 2008,
the US State Department approved the
request, but the White House did not
get around to signing the Executive
Order. It obviously was not a
priority for anyone, nor should such
a minor issue have been a priority.
So why did President Reagan, in
1983, grant Interpol some but not
all of the available immunities?
Some explanation of Interpol’s
structure will help here. Interpol
is headquartered in Lyon, France.
Today it has over 600 employees,
consisting of permanent staff, as
well as employees from many
different national law enforcement
organizations who are “seconded”
(loaned) to Interpol for a few
years. Every one of the 188 nations
which participates in Interpol has a
“National Central Bureau” (NCB)
which coordinates interaction with
Interpol. The NCB offices are
located in the home country, and
they are staffed by employees of the
home country, not by Interpol
employees. The United States has the
largest NCB, consisting of
approximately 80 employees in
Washington, D.C., plus an auxiliary
NCB in San Juan. The NCB is
responsible for transmitting the
data which the US chooses to provide
to Interpol, and thereby make
accessible to the NCBs of other
countries. Such data include the
identification numbers of lost or
stolen US passports, fingerprints or
DNA for some criminals, and so on.
The NCB in the United States is
not an international
organization. It is a part of the US
Department of Justice, and is
subject to precisely the same laws
as any other part of the Department
of Justice. The NCB staff interacts
with Interpol, but they are
employees of the federal government,
not of Interpol. Neither the Reagan
nor the Obama Executive Orders apply
to the NCB offices, nor could they.
As of 1983, Interpol had no staff
or offices in the United States.
However, a 1981 D.C. Circuit
decision, Steinberg v.
International Criminal Police
Organization, 672 F.2d
927, held that Interpol could be
sued in federal courts, because
Interpol’s interaction with the US
NCB created sufficient US contacts
for a US court to assert long-arm
jurisdiction. The Circuit’s
decision was written by the
recently-appointed Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Steinberg pleaded a very
strong case for defamation:
Steinberg’s complaint identifies an
Interpol document, titled “Blue
International Notification
500/59-A3674,” describing him as a
wanted international criminal who
used the alias “Mark Moscowitz.”
Interpol widely communicated the
Notification, Steinberg alleges, to
its liaisons, among them, the United
States National Central Bureau (USNCB),
now located in the Department of
Justice, this country’s liaison with
Interpol. In the summer of 1975, on
learning of the document and
Interpol’s transmission of it to
liaisons, Steinberg asserts, he
notified Interpol and twice offered
proof that the Notification was
erroneous. Despite the proof he
offered, Steinberg further states,
Interpol continued to publish the
Notification and other statements
associating Steinberg with “Mark
Moscowitz.” It did so, according to
Steinberg, until late July 1976,
when Interpol finally conceded Leon
Steinberg was not “Mark Moscowitz.”
Steinberg seeks general and punitive
damages for the substantial injury
he alleges he has suffered as a
result of the Blue International
Notification.
Now vulnerable to US lawsuits,
Interpol asked the Reagan
administration to grant it IOIA
protection. The Reagan
administration at the time was
beginning to vastly amplify the US
relationship with Interpol. The
consequences, over the long term,
were a substantial increase in US
contributions to Interpol, the US
displacing France as the most
influential nation within Interpol,
and Interpol taking a major interest
in counter-terrorism. Given the
Reagan determination to work more
with Interpol, it is not surprising
that the administration granted
Interpol’s request for IOIA immunity
from civil lawsuits.
At the advice of the Department
of Justice, the Reagan Executive
Order did not grant complete IOIA
immunities, because they were
unnecessary. Interpol had no office
in the US, and therefore had no need
for IOIA’s protections of
international organization property
and files. The Obama Order simply
recognizes changed circumstances;
now that Interpol has a small US
office, it is appropriate that
Interpol have the standard
immunities for international
organization offices.
As I will detail in my research
paper, I believe that the
Reagan-granted civil lawsuit
immunity should be partially
rescinded, and, if necessary,
Congress should revise the IOIA to
allow for grants of only partial
immunity from civil suits. Interpol
is a much more competent
organization than it was in 1975,
when it allegedly defamed Steinberg.
Nevertheless, Interpol does
sometimes disseminate potential
defamatory information without
sufficient caution. First of all,
Interpol distributes “diffusions.”
A diffusion is a document from one
nation that a particular person is
wanted for a particular crime in
that nation. Diffusions are not
reviewed for factual accuracy by
Interpol staff, and they are not
formally endorsed by Interpol.
However, Interpol’s global
distribution of the diffusions
could, at least arguably, constitute
participation in defamation,
particularly when the diffusion is
created by a nation with a
notoriously corrupt and dishonest
law enforcement system.
Interpol’s official Notices (such
as the “Blue Notice” on Steinberg)
are given a higher standard of care.
(A Notice is not an
“international arrest warrant.” A
Red Notice is merely information
that a person is sought by a
particular country, for a particular
crime, and the country will
extradite him if given the
opportunity. A Blue Notice is a
request to collect additional
information about a person in
relation to a criminal matter.
Nevertheless, at least occasionally,
defamatory Notices are distributed.
Most notoriously, Interpol
distributed three Red Notices from
Kazakhstan containing false claims
that some political opponents of the
dictatorship had committed tax
crimes. Although Interpol staff
eventually opposed the Kazakhstan
Red Notices, the issue was decided
by the Interpol General Assembly
(Interpol’s governing body), which
narrowly voted in favor of the Red
Notices. Perhaps if Interpol had
faced a potential lawsuit for
knowingly distributing defamatory
information, the General Assembly
would have voted differently.
However, the big topic of concern
in the past several weeks has not
been “Interpol can get away with
defamation!!!!” The defamation
immunity problem has existed for 27
years. The current concerns about
the Obama Executive Order are about
the dangers of unaccountable
international police operating in
the United States. These concerns
are without merit. Interpol staff do
not even carry guns, and they
certainly do not engage in policing
in the United States.
Categories:
INTERPOL
The Examiner
on-line
newspapers have
provided forum
for a bevy of
authors who
write on Second
Amendment and
firearms policy
issues. There
are plenty of
good writers
among them, but
my favorite is
Howard Nemerov,
who writes for
the Austin
Examiner.
Howard´s
columns are
often data-rich
(such as his
latest piece, on
the failures of
police
protection in
Chicago). He is
no mere
commentator, but
instead works
hard to research
the facts and
advance the
story. Among his
recent articles
are an admirably
calm piece on
the Interpol
controversy,
and an examination
of international
data in which
shows that there
is no
relationship
between gun
ownership rates
and suicide
rates. Howard
is also my
co-author of the
Texas Review
of Law &
Politics
article,
Is There a
Relationship
between Guns and
Freedom?
Comparative
Results from 59
Nations.
Categories:
Uncategorized
This week’s National Journal poll of
asked right-leaning bloggers to list
the 5 most-likely Republican
presidential nominees in 2012.
Left-leaning bloggers were asked
to name which Republican would be
the strongest candidate. Mitt Romney
won both races handily. I voted for
Romney as most likely, but don’t
think he would be the most likely
candidate to win the general
election: “The Republican lower
tiers (e.g., Thune) might be much
stronger in a general election than
would be the better-known
possibilities (e.g., Romney, Palin,
Huckabee, Gingrich).” Categories:
Politics
This week’s
National Journal poll of political
bloggers asked for a prediction
about how many House seats the
Democrats would lose in the November
2010 elections. Significantly, not
one of the bloggers predicted a
large enough loss to change control
of the chamber. On the Right, 45%
predicted a loss of 31–40 seats,
while the rest predicted lower. On
the Left, the median was in the
11–20 range. The second question
asked for a grade on President
Obama’s economic performance. The
Left gave him a C-, while the Right
awarded a D-. I voted for F: “Taking
the irresponsible Bush deficits and
making them much, much worse.
Spending vast amounts of the
‘stimulus’ on wasteful pork,
giveaways and political payoffs
rather than infrastructure or other
useful projects. Continuing the Bush
TARP program of transferring wealth
from productive working people to
the bankers who helped cause the
meltdown. And turning the auto
industry into a federal welfare
program.”
Categories:
Politics
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